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The makers of uniform international commercial law have traditionally used an instrument of public
international law – the treaty between States, or “convention” – in order to unify commercial law rules
governing the relations between private parties (merchants). The resulting “dual character” of such
conventions as creatures of both treaty law and private law gives rise to a host of difficult legal questions.
Maybe more than by any other type of legal rules, such questions are raised by reservations, i.e. formal
declarations by which States “opt out” of certain provisions in uniform law conventions, leaving it to the
courts to determine the precise effect on contracts between private parties. The 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) ranks as one of the most successful
uniform international commercial law instrument of all times, having been ratified by eighty-three States
worldwide, among them the United States, 24 of the 28 EU States, Brazil, Russia, China, and Japan. The
present article takes the 35th anniversary of the CISG as an occasion to provide an overview of the
experiences that have been made with reservations thereunder, investigating the various difficulties that the
dual character of its reservations has caused in theory and in practice. In doing so, the article first discusses the
hotly disputed qualification of some of the CISG’s provisions as “reservations” or mere “declarations,” and its
legal consequences. It then challenges the commonly held perception that reservations reduce the degree of
uniformity under international commercial law conventions, arguing that reservations should be regarded as a
tool enabling a “wider” uniformity. The article goes on to address problems that have emerged in practice
under the CISG, as notably the tendency among courts to overlook reservations and the significant
uncertainty they seem to cause both in the eyes of government officials and – maybe more importantly – of
judges and arbitrators deciding cases. Finally, it looks forward to the next thirty-five years and discusses the
(likely) rule of reservations in future CISG practice, including the trend to withdraw reservations, which
reservations may be here to stay and which may even gain in importance in the future. In summary, the article
presents the most comprehensive treatment yet of reservations under the most important uniform
international commercial law convention in force, identifying important lessons to be learned for the
unification of commercial law in general.
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INTRODUCTION
century ago, the goal of the international unification of
private and commercial law was famously described by
Lord Justice Kennedy as “the security and the peace of mind of
the shipowner, the banker, or the merchant,”1 thereby indicating
that the primary beneficiaries of uniform lawmaking are private
1. Lord Justice Kennedy, The Unification of Law, 10 J. SOC’YCOMP. LEGIS.
212, 214–15 (1909).
A
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citizens. Nevertheless, the most important vehicle in the unifi-
cation of international law has traditionally been the conven-
tion, i.e., treaties under public international law between States.
However, more recently other instruments like model laws or
mere “soft law” texts have gained importance.2 The continued
use of conventions can partially be explained by a second goal
that States pursue through the unification of law that Lord Jus-
tice Kennedy referred to as “the resulting moral gain . . . , a
neighbourly feeling, a sincere sentiment of human solidarity[,]”3
namely: the promotion of friendly relations among States.
The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods4 (“Sales Convention” or “CISG”) ranks
today as one of the most successful conventions unifying matters
of commercial law. With currently over eighty State parties,5 the
CISG’s provisions on contract formation and the law of sales po-
tentially6 apply to more than 80 percent of all international sales
contracts worldwide.7 The CISG’s preamble clearly reflects the
two goals that Lord Justice Kennedy identified seventy years
earlier, stating on one hand “that the adoption of uniform rules
which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and
take into account the different social, economic and legal sys-
tems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in inter-
national trade and promote the development of international
trade,” and on the other “that the development of international
2. See José Angelo Estrella Faria, Future Directions of Legal Harmonisa-
tion and Law Reform: Stormy Seas or Prosperous Voyage?, 14 UNIFORML. REV.
5, 8–12 (2009); E. Allan Farnsworth, An International Restatement: The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 26 U. BALT. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1997).
3. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 214–15.
4. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, opened for signatureApr. 11, 1980, S. TREATYDOC.NO. 98-9 (1983), 1489
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter Sales Convention or
CISG].
5. As of May 1, 2015, eighty-three States had become Contracting States
of the Sales Convention.
6. Even if the Convention’s prerequisites for its applicability are met, its
application to a particular sales contract can be excluded by way of party agree-
ment in accordance with Article 6 CISG.
7. SeeUlrich G. Schroeter, Empirical Evidence of Courts’ and Counsels Ap-
proach to the CISG (with Some Remarks on Professional Liability), in
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 649, 649 (Larry DiMatteo
ed., 2014).
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trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit is an important
element in promoting friendly relations among States.” Thirty-
five years after its adoption at a Diplomatic Conference in Vi-
enna on April 11, 1980, the Sales Convention’s anniversary in
2015 provides a suitable occasion to consider a topic, which—
maybe more than any other—touches upon both the creation of
uniform private law and the legal relations between States: Res-
ervations and the CISG.
A. Reservations in Uniform Private Law Conventions
Within the realm of uniform private law, reservations are un-
usual creatures residing at the borderline between private law
and the law of treaties. Tucked away in the far corner of uniform
law conventions, like the Sales Convention, reservations are
usually placed in the concluding part of a convention’s text with
the imaginative title “Final Provisions,” and have traditionally
been ignored by academics.8 Only in recent years have the
CISG’s reservations for the first time attracted more attention,
primarily because State practice in this area developed in a sur-
prising direction.9 At the same time, case law emerging under
the Sales Convention has demonstrated the unexpected difficul-
ties that reservations can cause in everyday disputes arising out
of ordinary cross-border sales contracts. As will be demonstrated
in more detail below, these difficulties are mostly triggered by
one and the same factor, namely the dual character of reserva-
tions as an instrument of both treaty law and internationally
unified private law.
B. Introducing Reservations
In terms of customary public international law as codified in
Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,10 a reservation is “a unilateral statement, however
8. See Peter Winship, Final Provisions of UNCITRAL’s International Com-
mercial Law Conventions, 24 INT’L LAW. 711, 711 (1990) (“No commentator –
and I barely exaggerate – spends much time examining the ‘Final Provisions’
of international conventions.”).
9. See infra Part III.B.1.
10. The definition in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention reflects
the customary law notion of a reservation. Thomas Giegerich, Treaties, Multi-
lateral, Reservations to, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 1 (R. Wolfrum ed., 2010); Christian Walter, Formu-
lation of Reservations, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
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phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, ac-
cepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty in their application to that State.”11 Beyond this com-
monly accepted definition, the subject of reservations has tradi-
tionally raised a host of difficult legal problems. A well-known
public international law treatise once described it as “a matter
of considerable obscurity in the realm of juristic speculation.”12
The CISG authorizes no less than five of such reservations in its
Articles 92–96, although this number is already amatter of some
dispute.13
What is equally disputed is the relative degree to which reser-
vations have actually been used by CISG Contracting States.
General assessments by commentators range from “reservations
have been minimal”14 to “have been widely utilized.”15 If we let
numbers speak (leaving aside the significant differences in effect
that the various reservations have upon the Convention’s prac-
tical application), the count is as follows: on April 11, 2005, the
1980 U.N. Sales Convention’s twenty-fifth birthday, the then
sixty-five Contracting States between them had declared a total
of thirty-one reservations,16 with the reserving States including
some of the largest CISG Contracting States (such as the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, Russia, and the United States).17 After
COMMENTARY 239, 240, para. 1 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds.,
2012).
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
12. DANIEL PATRICKO’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 250–51 (2d ed. 1965).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. LISA SPAGNOLO, CISG EXCLUSION AND LEGAL EFFICIENCY 70–71 (2014).
15. Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Interna-
tional Sales Law, 25 INT’LREV. L. & ECON. 446, 476 (2005).
16. Reservations made by a Contracting State in accordance with Article 93
or 94 CISG were counted as one reservation, even if they related to more than
one territorial unit (Article 93 CISG) or to more than one other State with
closely related legal rules (Article 94 CISG). For some more recent numbers,
see infra p. 7.
17. Ulrich G. Schroeter, The Withdrawal of Reservations Under Uniform
Private Law Conventions, 20 UNIFORM L. REV. 1, 1 (2015).
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that date, only two further States, Paraguay in 2006, and Arme-
nia in 2008,18 made reservations, and Armenia has since re-
mained the last State to declare a reservation under the Conven-
tion.
C. Experience with Reservations Under the CISG: Taking Stock
of the First Thirty-Five Years
Thirty-five years after the adoption of the Sales Convention on
April 11, 1980 is an appropriate time to look back and assess the
experiences created by the reservations under the Convention.
From the perspective of international law, the purpose of such
an assessment is threefold.
First, one of the interpretative goals stipulated in Article 7(1)
CISG—the need to promote uniformity in the Convention’s ap-
plication—is commonly read as calling for the evaluation of ex-
isting case law19 and of legal writings20 that have previously ad-
dressed provisions in the Sales Convention. As Article 7(1)
CISG’s guidelines also apply to the interpretation of the CISG’s
Final Clauses (Articles 89–101 CISG),21 an overview over the
past practice in applying the Sales Convention’s reservations
may serve as a useful tool in further enhancing their interna-
tionally uniform interpretation.
Second, customary public international rules on treaty inter-
pretation similarly envisage taking into account past interpre-
tation practices. In particular, Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that in inter-
preting a treaty, there shall be taken into account “any subse-
quent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
18. For further remarks on the Armenian reservation, see infra Part IV.B.1.
19. Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Article 7, inCOMMENTARYONTHE
UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 120, 124–26,
paras. 10–13 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010).
20. Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Article 7, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 111, 130–31 para. 43 (Stefan
Kröll et al. eds., 2011); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & ULRICH G. SCHROETER,
INTERNATIONALESUN-KAUFRECHT: EIN STUDIEN- UNDERLÄUTERUNGSBUCH ZUM
ÜBEREINKOMMEN DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN ÜBER VERTRA ̈GE ÜBER DEN
INTERNATIONALENWARENKAUF (CISG) para. 96 (5th ed. 2013).
21. Ulrich G. Schroeter, Backbone or Backyard of the Convention? The
CISG’s Final Provisions, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAWACROSS
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERTH. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION
OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 427, 428 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schro-
eter eds., 2008).
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the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”22
When this provision is read in light of the Sales Convention’s
nature as a uniform private law convention applied by commer-
cial courts to contracts between private parties, its reference to
the agreement of “the parties” regarding the treaty’s interpreta-
tion should be understood as referring to the agreement among
the courts in different CISG Contracting States, i.e., the prevail-
ing court practice. If so construed, the approach of Arti-
cle 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties is arguably in line with the interpretative goals imposed by
Article 7(1) CISG.23
Third, the experiences formulated by the use of reservations
under the CISG may be helpful for future law unification pro-
jects in the area of contract and commercial law, e.g., a to-be uni-
form law instrument on general contract law.24 Should such a
22. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(3)(b).
23. Jan Hellner,Gap-Filling by Analogy: Art. 7 of the U.N. Sales Convention
in Its Historical Context, in FESTSKRIFT TILL LARS HJERNER: STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 219 (Jan Ramberg & Lars Hjerner eds., 1990);
ULRICH G. SCHROETER, UN-KAUFRECHT UND EUROPÄISCHES
GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT––VERHÄLTNIS UND WECHSELWIRKUNGEN [CISG AND
EUROPEAN UNION LAW: RELATIONSHIP AND INTERACTION] 292 para. 18 (2005)
[hereinafter CISG & EU LAW]; WOLFGANG WITZ ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
EINHEITLICHES KAUFRECHT: PRAKTIKER-KOMMENTAR UND
VERTRAGSGESTALTUNG ZUM CISG [UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
PRACTICTIONER COMMENTS AND CONTRACT DRAFTING FOR CISG] 87–88, paras.
20–21 (2000). See generally Marianne Roth & Richard Happ, Interpretation of
Uniform Law Instruments According to Principles of International Law, 2
UNIFORM L. REV. 700 (1997). Where the two provisions deviate, CISG Article
7(1) should prevail, as the rules on treaty interpretation in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties gives precedence to interpretation rules in
particular treaties. Schroeter, supra note 21, at 428; CISG & EU LAW, at 298
para. 32.
24. SeeUNCITRAL, Possible Future Work in the Area of International Con-
tract Law: Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL
in the Area of International Contract Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/758 (May 8, 2012)
[hereinafter Swiss Proposal] (discussing the need for a uniform law instrument
on general contract law); Ingeborg Schwenzer,Who Needs a Uniform Contract
Law, and Why?, 58 VILL. L. REV. 723, 727 (2013); Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Ap-
plicable Law, the CISG, and the Future Convention on International Commer-
cial Contracts, 58 VILL. L. REV., 733, 738 n.23 (2013). See generally Olaf Meyer,
The “Swiss Proposal” on Future Work on International Contract Law: Building
on Sandy Soil?, in 18 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND ARBITRATION:
BOUNDARIES AND INTERSECTIONS 57 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds.,
2014).
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future instrument take the form of a convention (i.e. a public in-
ternational law treaty),25 the subject of the inclusion and appli-
cation of reservations would inevitably and by necessity arise,
and any lessons learned under the Sales Convention would ide-
ally be taken into account in drafting a new sister convention.
D. Outline
In describing the lessons learned, this article will not primar-
ily focus on individual CISG reservations and the specific expe-
riences relating to them. This has already been addressed by col-
leagues elsewhere, in particular with respect to the withdrawal
of Article 92 CISG reservations in Scandinavia26 and with re-
spect to the reservations under Articles 95 and 96 CISG.27 In-
stead, this article will provide a more general overview of the
developments concerning the Convention’s reservations, com-
bined with a critical assessment of those developments.
The article will proceed as follows: Part I is dedicated to two
basic issues, namely the disputed qualification of some of the
CISG’s provisions as “reservations” in the legal sense of the
term28 and the historical background of these provisions.29
Part II will discuss reservations’ general usefulness in the uni-
form private law context and whether reservations decrease uni-
formity,30 or rather enable a wider uniformity in uniform law-
making.31 Part III will also address a number of difficulties that
25. See Perales Viscasillas, supra note 24, at 738; Schwenzer, supra note 24,
at 727–28, 730.
26. Camilla Baasch Andersen, Reservations of the CISG: Regional Trends
and Developments, in GLOBALIZATION VERSUS REGIONALIZATION 1, 7–10 (Inge-
borg Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2013); Thomas Neumann, The Contin-
ued Saga of the CISG in the Nordic Countries: Reservations and Transfor-
mation Reconsidered, 2013 NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 1 (2013).
27. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, The Cross-Border Freedom of Form Principle
Under Reservation: The Role of Articles 12 and 96 CISG in Theory and Practice,
33 J. L.&COM. 79, 87–88 (2014) [hereinafter Schroeter, The Cross-Border Free-
dom of Form Principle Under Reservation]. See generally Ulrich G. Schroeter
(Rapporteur), Reservations Under Articles 95 and 96 CISG, Advisory Opinion
No. 15, CISG Advisory Council (Oct. 21–22, 2013), in INTERNATIONALES
HANDELSRECHT [INTERNATIONALTRADELAW] 116 (Rolf Herber et al. eds., 2014).
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See infra Part III.A.
31. See infra Part III.B.
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have arisen in practice under the Sales Convention. More specif-
ically, this part will focus on the fact that reservations have often
been overlooked by courts,32 and the significant uncertainty res-
ervations seem to cause in both the eyes of government officials33
and—maybe more importantly—of judges and arbitrators decid-
ing cases.34 Part IV looks forward to the next thirty-five years
and discusses the likely role of reservations in future CISG prac-
tice. This discussion examines the continuing trend to withdraw
reservations,35 one reservation that may be here to stay,36 and
another reservation that may even gain in importance in the fu-
ture.37 The final part briefly concludes.
I. BASIC ISSUES CONCERNING THE CISG’S RESERVATIONS
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to first address the ques-
tion, which among the “declarations” authorized in Part IV of
the Sales Convention constitute reservations as defined by the
law of treaties.38 A brief overview of the drafting history of Arti-
cles 92–96 CISG39 will provide the background necessary to un-
derstand some of the difficulties that have arisen throughout the
practical application of the CISG’s reservations.
A. “Reservations” and “Declarations” Under the CISG
The first indication of the uncertainties surrounding reserva-
tions under the CISG is that it is not only disputed how many
different reservations the Convention’s text authorizes, but even
whether the CISG contains reservations at all.
1. Views among Commentators
In legal writings on the Sales Convention, there are insofar
three schools of thought. The majority among CISG commenta-
tors assumes that the Sales Convention allows five reservations,
32. See infra Part IV.A.
33. See infra Part IV.B.1.
34. See infra Part IV.B.2.
35. See infra Part V.A.
36. See infra Part V.B.
37. See infra Part V.C.
38. See infra Part II.A.
39. See infra Part II.B.
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namely those defined in Articles 92, 93, 94, 95, and 96 CISG.40
Writers in this majority rarely give a reason for their position,
maybe because its correctness is regarded as obvious. It indeed
finds some support in the wording of Article 98 CISG, according
to which “[n]o reservations are permitted except those expressly
authorized in this Convention,”41 the term “those” indicating
that the Convention must contain more than one reservation.
Furthermore, Articles 92–96 CISG seemingly match the general
definition of Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,42 as they all purport to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the CISG.
The second group of commentators nevertheless believes that
the Sales Convention contains no reservations at all, in spite of
the reference to “reservations” in Article 98 CISG. They rather
40. James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of Inter-
national Sales, 32 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 273, 311 (1999); Malcolm Evans, Article
98, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 664, 664 para. 2.1
(1987); Franco Ferrari, Articles 89–101, in SCHLECHTRIEM/SCHWENZER:
KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT [SCHLECHTRIEM/SCHWENZER:
COMMENTARY ON THE CISG] 951, para. 9, (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 6th ed.
2013); Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized
System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and other Challenges to
the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J. L. & COM. 187, 193–94 (1998);
Johnny Herre, Article 98, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1217, 1217 (Stefan Kröll et al. eds.,
2011); JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNITEDNATIONS CONVENTION 691, para. 458 (Harry M. Fletcher ed., 4th
ed. 2009); Peter Huber, Article 98, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGERLICHENGESETZBUCH Art. 98, para. 1 (6th ed. 2012); JOSEPHLOOKOFSKY,
UNDERSTANDING THECISG 167, § 8.3–171, § 8.8 (4th ed. 2012); Ulrich Magnus,
Wiener UN-Kaufrecht [Vienna CISG], in J. VON STAUDINGERSKOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN [J.
VON STAUDINGER’S COMMENTARY ON THE CIVIL CODE WITH THE INTRODUCTORY
STATUTE AND ANCILLARY LAWS] art. 98, para. 1 (Michael Martinek ed., revised
ed. 2013); Francesco G. Mazzotta, Final Provisions (Articles 90–101 CISG), in
APRACTITIONER’SGUIDE TO THECISG 819, 832 (Camilla B. Andersen et al. eds.,
2010); Ingo Saenger, Article 98, in KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH [COMMENTARY ON THE CIVIL CODE] para. 1 (3d ed. 2012); Peter
Schlechtriem et al., Introduction to Articles 89–101, in SCHLECHTRIEM &
SCHWENZER: COMMENTARYONTHEUNCONVENTIONONTHE INTERNATIONALSALE
OFGOODS (CISG) 1170, 1170–72 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010); Marco
Torsello, Reservations to International Uniform Commercial Law Conventions,
5 UNIFORM L. REV. 85, 91 (2000).
41. CISG, supra note 4, art. 98.
42. See supra Part I.A.
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draw a strict distinction between “declarations” and “reserva-
tions,”43 pointing out that the language of Articles 92–96 CISG
exclusively speaks of “declarations,” without ever mentioning
the term “reservation.”44
A third group of writers accepts that Articles 92 and 94–96
CISG provide for reservations, but doubts whether Article 93
CISG constitutes a reservation stricto sensu.45 This position re-
sounds a long-standing discussion in general treaty law, where
the prevailing view today is that “federal state clauses” are not
reservations in the sense of Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.46 This view was also ex-
pressed during the discussion of Article 93 CISG at the 1980 Vi-
enna Diplomatic Conference by the Deputy Chief of the U.N.
Treaty Session, who then served as Assistant Secretary of the
Second Committee.47
2. Discussion
In order to discuss the approaches outlined above,48 it is ap-
propriate to distinguish between three issues. First, the legal
qualification of the declarations authorized by Articles 92–96
43. See Luca G. Castellani, Reviewing CISG Declarations: Some Lessons
Learned, in UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION: CHINA AND THE WORLD, CONFERENCE PAPERS (2013); Peter
Mankowski, Article 97, in INTERNATIONALES VERTRAGSRECHT [International
Contract Law] 965 para. 1 (2d ed. 2011); Mazzotta, supra note 40, at 831–32
(describing the use of the terms “declaration” and “reservation”).
44. MICHAEL G. BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 519–20 para.
10.54 (3d ed. 2013) (“The CISG nowhere else deals with ‘reservations,’ but it
does allow in a number of instances States to make ‘declarations,’which appear
to serve the same purpose as reservations.”).
45. Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 385
para. 2 (1992).
46. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/66/10/Add.1, at 34 (2011); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 170–71 (1st ed. 2000); Symeón Karagiannis, Article 29 Convention of
1969, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY
731, 737–39, paras. 19–24 (Oliver Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
47. United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Official Records: Documents of the Conference and Summary Records
of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Main Committees, at 459,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1991) [hereinafter Official Records]. For more infor-
mation on the role of the different committees during the 1980 Diplomatic Con-
ference in Vienna, see HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 10–11, para. 10.
48. See supra Part II.A.1.
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CISG as reservations will be addressed,49 before the special case
of the federal state clause in Article 93 CISG is investigated in
more detail.50 Finally, the applicability of Articles 20–23 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to reservations
under the CISG will be discussed.51
a. Declarations Under Articles 92–96 CISG as Reservations
It is submitted that Articles 92–96 CISG all qualify as reser-
vations, and that the majority view summarized earlier52 is ac-
cordingly correct. This is first of all due to the fact that the lan-
guage used in Articles 92–96 CISG, notably the lack of the term
“reservation” therein, should be considered as irrelevant when it
comes to the legal qualification of these treaty clauses. Arti-
cle 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
itself makes this clear by defining “reservation” as “a unilateral
statement, however phrased or named . . . .”53 Moreover, the In-
ternational Law Commission’s “Guide to Practice on Reserva-
tions to Treaties”54 as well as treaty law scholars55 agree that it
is not the phrasing or name of a unilateral statement formulated
in respect of a treaty that determines its legal nature, but rather
the legal effect it purports to produce. That declarations made in
accordance with Articles 92–96 CISG purport to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the Sales Conven-
tion (as required by Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion)56 becomes immediately obvious when looking at the word-
ing in Article 95 CISG. Article 95 CISG authorizes Contracting
States to “declare at the time of the deposit of its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be
bound by subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1 of this Convention,”57
49. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
50. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
51. See infra Part II.A.2.c.
52. See supra note 40.
53. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(d).
54. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 46, para. 1.3.2.
55. Giegerich, supra note 10, para. 1.
56. But see Luca G. Castellani, The CISG in Context of Complementary
Texts, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 683 n.4 (Larry A.
DiMatteo ed., 2014).
57. CISG, supra note 4, art. 95.
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but Articles 92, 93,58 94, and 96 CISG similarly fit this descrip-
tion.
Contrary to what is implied by some authors,59 the term “dec-
laration,” predominantly employed by the drafters of Arti-
cles 89–101 CISG, is therefore not being used therein as an al-
ternative to “reservation,” but rather as a wider, more compre-
hensive term. A declaration made by a Contracting State in re-
lation to the Sales Convention may accordingly qualify as a res-
ervation if it meets the conditions of Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It may, however, also
be a declaration that is not a reservation,60 but rather purports
to produce a different legal effect. Depending on their content,
such declarations may, inter alia, be declarations amending
prior declarations in accordance with Article 93(1) CISG in fine;
declarations joining in another State’s declaration in accordance
with Article 94(3) CISG; or denunciations of the Convention in
accordance with Article 101 CISG. Apart from these types of dec-
larations that are expressly mentioned in Articles 89–101 CISG,
Contracting States may also make other “declarations in gen-
eral” which similarly do not have the effect of reservations,61 as
specifically clarified during the discussions at the 1980 Vienna
Diplomatic Conference.62 Such declarations in general63 are gov-
erned by the rules of general treaty law,64 but must also be com-
patible with the provisions of the Sales Convention. As has been
58. For more information on CISG Article 93, see infra Part II.A.2.b.
59. See supra notes 43–44.
60. But see Michael Bridge, Uniform and Harmonized Sales Law: Choice of
Law Issues, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 973–
74, para. 16.121 (James J. Fawcett et al. eds., 2005) (“From this it may be in-
ferred that what the Vienna [Sales] Convention calls a declaration is a reser-
vation for the purpose of both the Convention itself and the UN Convention on
the Law of Treaties.”).
61. Evans, supra note 40, at 664–65, para. 2.3; Magnus, supra note 40,
art. 98, para. 1; Schlechtriem et al., supra note 40, at 1195.
62. Official Records, supra note 47, at 459.
63. For background information on “political” declarations, which occur in
treaty practice, see AUST, supra note 46, at 103.
64. Evans, supra note 40, at 664–65, para. 2.3; Ferrari, supra note 40,
art. 98, para. 2; Herre, supra note 40, at 1217; Magnus, supra note 40, Art. 98,
para. 1; Schlechtriem et al., supra note 40, at 1195, para. 2.
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argued elsewhere,65 interpretative declarations relating to mat-
ters governed by the Sales Convention must insofar be consid-
ered incompatible with Article 7(1) CISG.
Finally, the interpretation outlined above is supported by the
legislative history of Article 98 CISG, the only provision of the
Sales Convention to explicitly mention “reservations.” The Aus-
trian delegation that first proposed its inclusion at the Vienna
Diplomatic Conference66 later suggested an alternative wording,
which, after further modification by the French delegation, read:
“No reservation or declaration other than those expressly pro-
vided for in this Convention shall be permitted.”67 During the
ensuing discussion, there was agreement among the delegates
that at least the draft provisions corresponding to today’s Arti-
cles 92, 94, and 96 CISG constituted reservations, irrespective of
whether or not the reference to “reservation or declaration”
would be kept.68 Article 93 CISG was regarded as a slightly more
complicated case,69 and Article 95 CISG had at this stage not
been (re-)proposed.70 Against this historic background, the use
of the terms “reservation” in Article 98 CISG (as eventually
adopted) and “declaration” elsewhere in Articles 89–101 CISG
cannot support any challenge of the prevailing and correct view
that Articles 92–96 CISG all qualify as reservations.
65. Torsello, supra note 40, at 117; Schroeter, supra note 21, at 455–56. But
seeMankowski, supra note 43, art. 98 para. 2.
66. Official Records, supra note 47, at 146.
67. Id. at 459.
68. See id. at 459. Dr. Ihor Tarko, representative of Austria, said that
his delegation had proposed that the word “declaration” be included
because the final clauses referred only to declarations and there might
be some confusion between declarations proper and declarations con-
taining reservations . . . . If the sense was clear with the use of the
word “reservation” alone, his delegation would agree to the omission
of the word “declaration” . . . .
Id.
69. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
70. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
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b. Article 93 CISG as a Reservation
The nature of Article 93 CISG as a reservation requires further
discussion, as this qualification has been challenged for the ad-
ditional reason that federal state clauses are generally not con-
sidered to be reservations in treaty law doctrine.71
The cornerstone on which the latter position rests is the defi-
nition of the term “reservation” in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which speaks of “a uni-
lateral statement made by a State whereby it purports to ex-
clude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty in their application to that State.”72 Federal state clauses,
so the reasoning goes, are supposedly not covered by this defini-
tion because they do not purport to exclude or modify the legal
effect of certain provisions of a treaty or the treaty as a whole
with respect to certain specific aspects to an entire State. In-
stead they aim at the nonapplication of an entire treaty to a part
of the declaring State’s territory. This type of declaration consti-
tutes a deviation from the default rule concerning the territorial
scope of treaties in Article 29 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, pursuant to which a treaty is binding upon
each party in respect of its entire territory unless a different in-
tention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established. Fed-
eral state clauses are accordingly not reservations, but rather an
expression of a “different intention” in the sense of Article 29 of
the Vienna Convention: the State is not excluding the legal effect
of the treaty in respect of a particular territory but is identifying
“its territory,” in the sense of Article 29, where the treaty is to
be applied.73 This approach is also reflected in the 1974 United
Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, where the federal state clause in Arti-
cle 31—the provision that Article 93 CISG was modelled after—
is not contained in the Convention’s Part III titled “Declarations
and reservations,” but rather in Part II titled “Implementation.”
71. See supra notes 45–47.
72. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(d) (emphasis added).
73. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 46, para. 1.5.3; Kerstin Odendahl, Article
29, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 489, 493,
para. 12 (Oliver Dörr & Kristin Schmalenbach eds., 2012) (citing Article 93
CISG as an example).
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Irrespective of whether this outlined approach is considered
convincing,74 it is submitted that its application does not affect
the reservation status of Article 93 CISG, despite the latter’s
common75 description as “federal state clause.” The reason is
that an Article 93 CISG declaration not only defines the territory
to which the declaring State will apply the Sales Convention, but
modifies the application of one provision of the Convention in its
application by courts of any Contracting State (erga omnes). The
provision so modified is Article 1(1) CISG, as indicated by Arti-
cle 93(3) CISG. Although Article 93(3) CISG does not contain the
arguably clearer terms “is not to be considered a Contracting
State within paragraph (1) of article 1 of this Convention” that
are used in Article 92(2) CISG, the words “is considered not to
be in a Contracting State” in Article 93(3) CISG should equally
be understood as a reference to Article 1(1) CISG.76 Accordingly,
Article 93 CISG in fact does meet the “modification of certain
provisions”77 criterion in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties.78
The Sales Convention’s federal state clause remains, however,
ill at ease with the final requirement contained in Article 2(1)(d)
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, namely
the modification of treaty provisions “in their application to that
[i.e. the declaring] State.”79 As the wording of Article 93(3) CISG
makes clear, a declaration under Article 93(1) CISG goes much
further, as it results in the Convention’s nonapplication to con-
tracts concluded by private parties residing in a certain territory
74. Cf. Anthony Aust, Treaties, Territorial Application, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW paras. 22–23 (Rüdiger Wolfrum
ed., 2006).
75. See, e.g., Herre, supra note 40, at 1217, para. 1.
76. Malcolm Evans, Article 93, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW 645, 648, para. 2.4 (1987); see also infra Part IV.B.2.b.i.
77. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(d).
78. In addition, it should be pointed out that otherwise Article 94 CISG
would arguably not qualify as a reservation, as this provision similarly results
in a nonapplication of the entire Sales Convention.
79. Cf. Bridge, supra note 44, at 522 para. 10.57 (addressing the same point
with respect to the reservation under Article 95 CISG). But see ENDERLEIN &
MASKOW, supra note 45, 385, para. 1.
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of the federal State and has to be observed by courts in all Con-
tracting States (not only the declaring State),80 thereby creating
the erga omnes effect described earlier. This apparent incompat-
ibility is nevertheless not unusual, but rather occurs under al-
most every treaty creating uniform private law. The definition
of Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties has therefore long been recognized as hardly appropri-
ate for normative treaties that do not create a bundle of bilateral
treaty relationships but instead establish generally applicable
erga omnes rules in the common interest of the treaty commu-
nity as a whole.81 Uniform private law conventions being one ex-
ample. The solution lies in the principle lex specialis derogat legi
generali, with Article 93(3) CISG insofar containing an admissi-
ble82 deviation from general treaty law.
In summary, the Sales Convention’s federal state clause in Ar-
ticle 93 CISG accordingly qualifies as a reservation.
3. A Different Question: Applicability of Articles 20–23 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to the CISG’s
Reservations
At this point, it is useful to clarify that the conclusions previ-
ously stated do not propose that the rules on reservations con-
tained in general treaty law and codified in Articles 20–23 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties necessarily ap-
ply to Articles 92–96 CISG.83 The reason is that the rules laid
down in the 1969 Vienna Convention are generally agreed to be
merely residuary in nature84 and are accordingly displaced
whenever a given treaty contains different rules on particulari-
ties of its reservations. As the Sales Convention’s Final Clauses
in Part IV (Articles 89–101 CISG) contain explicit provisions as
80. Bridge, supra note 60, at 973–74, para. 16.123; Schroeter, supra note 21,
at 444; Torsello, supra note 40, at 97–98. But cf. Filip De Ly, Sources of Inter-
national Sales Law: An Eclectic Model, 25 J.L. & COM. 1, 9 (2005) (“It must be
noted that [an Article 92 reservation] is inapplicable in non-contracting states
and non-reservation states and that even in the reservation states . . . it will
only apply if the law applicable by virtue of the reservation forum’s conflict
rule is [that of the reservation state].”).
81. Giegerich, supra note 10, para. 19.
82. See infra Part II.A.3.
83. But see ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 43, 385 para. 1.
84. Giegerich, supra note 10, para. 7; Alain Pellet, Article 22, in 1 THE
VIENNACONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 568, 577, para.
34art. (Oliver Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
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well as general principles in accordance with Article 7(2) CISG
governing the functioning of its reservations, there is hardly any
room for recourse to the residuary Articles 20–23 of the 1969 Vi-
enna Convention.85 At the same time, there is no need to avoid a
qualification of Articles 92–96 CISG as “reservations” with the
primary aim to prevent general treaty law from interfering with
uniform private law.86 The residuary nature of Articles 20–23 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention takes sufficient care of that.
B. Historical Background of the CISG’s Reservations in a Nut-
shell
We next turn to the historical background of the Sales Conven-
tion’s five reservations. This historical context is useful for pur-
poses of interpreting the respective provisions, as recourse to the
legislative history is recognized as one of the most important in-
terpretative methods under Article 7(1) CISG.87 In this respect,
the Sales Convention deviates from general rules on interpreta-
tion under treaty law, as Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties merely allows for a historic interpre-
tation as a supplementary method (where interpretation other-
wise “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure” or leads “to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”).88Again, Ar-
ticle 7(1) CISG must prevail in this context, as its principles also
apply to the interpretation of the CISG’s reservations89 and
thereby displace the residuary rules of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion.90
85. See Bridge, supra note 60, at 973, para. 16.122; Schroeter, supra note 21,
at 431.
86. This position was more recently adopted in UNCITRAL, UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, at 98, para. 317, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.2 (2007).
(“This distinction [between reservations and declarations] is important be-
cause reservations to international treaties typically trigger a formal system
of acceptances and objections, for instance as provided in articles 20 and 21 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”).
87. Magnus, supra note 40, art. 7, para. 35; SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHROETER,
supra note 20, para. 105; Schwenzer &Hachem, supra note 19, at 130, para. 22.
88. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 32.
89. Schlechtriem et al., supra note 40, at 1170; Schroeter, supra note 21,
at 428. Contra ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 55 para. 2.2; WITZ ET
AL., supra note 23, para. 6.
90. See supra note 24.
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1. Effect of Article 98 CISG on the Reservations’ Initiation
By way of a preliminary remark, it is important to note that
Article 98 CISG limits reservations under the CISG to those ex-
pressly authorized in the Convention. This clause, which is
based on Article 19(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties91 and today constitutes a common feature in uniform
international private law conventions,92 has a further indirect
effect upon the manner in which reservations become part of a
convention, as it leads to a two-step process.93 In the first step,
the content of each admissible reservation must be agreed upon
among the drafters of a convention, before in the second step one
or more Contracting States can declare (Article 19 of the 1969
Vienna Convention uses the term “formulate”) such an author-
ized reservation. Any State interested in using a certain reser-
vation must therefore already initiate its authorization at a con-
vention’s drafting stage, and cannot wait until it may later con-
template the ratification of the convention. Restricting admissi-
ble reservations to those expressly authorized in a convention’s
text at the same time means that the range of possible reserva-
tions are “frozen in” at the moment the treaty’s text is being
adopted in accordance with Article 9 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties. In case of the CISG, this date was
April 11, 1980.
2. Historical “Sponsors” of Individual Reservations Under the
CISG
Against this background, it is of interest to briefly look at the
way in which the five reservations authorized by the CISG made
their way into the Sales Convention’s final text. In this regard,
three groups of reservations can be distinguished.
The first group comprises reservations that were already pro-
posed by particular States during early stages of the prepara-
tions that culminated in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference of
1980. From the outset, the concerned States regarded the inclu-
sion of these reservations as an indispensable condition without
which they would not be able to ratify the Convention. The rep-
resentatives of other States in turn viewed these reservations as
91. ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 385 para. 1; Evans, supra
note 40, at 664, para. 2.2; Herre, supra note 40, at 1217.
92. Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 98 para. 1.
93. See infra Part III.B.2.
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a compromise necessary in order to convince those States to ac-
cept the Sales Convention’s text with the content the majority
considered desirable.94 In view of these interests, the desirability
of the reservations of this group was rarely challenged, and the
discussions within the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and later at the Diplomatic Con-
ference in Vienna were limited to drafting issues.
This was true for the Article 94 CISG reservation which looks
back on a particularly long history; already the very first draft
for a uniform sales law written by Ernst Rabel95 in 1935 con-
tained a predecessor provision.96 Notably, the Scandinavian
States had always made clear that they would only be willing to
accede to the Sales Convention if they could continue to apply
their regionally harmonized sales laws to their intra-Nordic
trade.97 In order to do so, they proposed and supported a reser-
vation like today’s Article 94 CISG.
The Article 96 CISG reservation, which makes an exception
from the freedom-of-form principle under the Convention,98 was
included upon the request of the Soviet Union (“USSR”), which
also spoke for other than Socialist countries with planned econ-
omies.99 It first appeared (with a somewhat different wording) in
94. See Peter Schlechtriem, Articles 89–101, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 918, 929, para. 2
(2d ed. 2005) (“[O]nly in that way could, for example, the Scandinavian states
be persuaded to apply the CISG at least in their relations with other coun-
tries.”); Schroeter, The Cross-Border Freedom of Form Principle Under Reser-
vation, supra note 27, at 85–86 (discussing CISG Article 96).
95. For background information on Ernst Rabel, see generally Max Rhein-
stein, In Memory of Ernst Rabel, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 185 (1956); Bernhard Gross-
feld & Peter Winship, The Law Professor Refugee, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. &
COM. 3, 11 (1992).
96. See SCHROETER, supra note 23, § 10 para. 2.
97. See Joseph Lookofsky, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN SCANDINAVIA §§ 2-
3, 3-1 (1996); Schlechtriem, supra note 94, at 929 para. 2. Other States that
showed an interest in using Article 94 CISG were the Benelux countries (Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) as well as Australia and New Zea-
land. See Official Records, supra note 47, at 436.
98. See Schroeter, The Cross-Border Freedom of Form Principle Under Res-
ervation, supra note 27, at 83.
99. See id. at 81–82.
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a proposal made within UNCITRAL in 1971100 and was subse-
quently included into the so-called New York draft of the Sales
Convention of 1978,101 from where onwards it formed part and
parcel of the general freedom-of-form discussion.
The Article 92 CISG reservation was the last of this group to
enter the scene. It was only requested once the decision had been
reached within UNCITRAL to include both the provisions on the
formation of contracts and the provisions on the sale of goods
into one and the same Convention.102 During the discussion pre-
ceding this decision, the Scandinavian States had insisted on a
possibility to ratify only the sales law part,103 which therefore
was introduced in the form of a reservation, which became Arti-
cle 92 CISG.
The second group comprises one boilerplate reservation,
namely the “federal state clause” in Article 93 CISG previously
addressed.104 This provision was not included upon suggestion
from a State, but rather from the UNCITRAL Secretariat that
prepared a draft for the CISG’s final clauses105 for discussion at
the Vienna Diplomatic Conference of 1980. The reservation’s
purpose is essentially unrelated to the uniform law content of
the Sales Convention in that it exclusively responds to the par-
ticular territorial structure of some States (federal or other)106
and their impact on the implementation of uniform law conven-
tions. In Vienna, Article 93’s inclusion was notably supported by
Australia and Canada.107
100. [1971] 2 U.N. Comm’n Int’l Trade L. Y.B. 48, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1971. For further detail, see Schroeter, The Cross-Border Free-
dom of Form Principle Under Reservation, supra note 27, at 85–86.
101. [1978] 9 U.N. Comm’n Int’l Trade L. Y.B. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1978.
102. See Gyula Eörsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 311 (1979)
(referring to this decision as “a significant step”).
103. See Official Records, supra note 47, at 74.
104. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
105. U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: Draft Articles Concerning Implementation, Declarations,
Reservations and other Final Clauses, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/6 (Oct. 31, 1979);
see also Evans, supra note 76, 645–47, para. 1.1–.5 (discussing alternative
drafts proposed by the UNCITRAL Secretariat).
106. For a more detailed discussion on this point, see infra Part V.B.
107. See Official Records, supra note 47, at 82, 434–36, 445–47.
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The third and final group could be assigned the heading “last-
minute additions.” It similarly comprises just one of the CISG’s
reservations, namely Article 95 CISG.108 Unusually, this reser-
vation neither had a direct predecessor in the 1964 Hague Uni-
form Sales Laws109 nor was discussed within UNCITRAL or its
working groups prior to the 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vi-
enna. It was not until the Vienna Conference was well under
way that the delegation representing Czechoslovakia (“CSSR”)
first proposed today’s Article 95 CISG during the second meeting
of the Second Committee on March 18, 1980,110 where it was re-
jected.111 On April 7, 1980, a mere four days before the Confer-
ence’s scheduled ending on April 11, 1980, the CSSR reintro-
duced its proposal in the Plenary, now offering two alternative
wordings.112 The Plenary finally discussed the proposal during
the late afternoon of April 10, 1980113 and accepted one of the
proposed wordings by twenty-four votes to seven, with a compar-
atively high number of sixteen abstentions.114 The majority de-
cision to accept the reservation at all was clearly driven by the
desire not to risk the support of the CSSR and other Socialist
countries for the Convention as a whole.115 The notable price for
Article 95’s surprising last-minute adoption116 are uncertainties
108. For a discussion on the legislative history of Article 95 CISG, see CISG
Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 118.
109. Article III of the Conventions relating to a Uniform Law on the For-
mation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“ULF”), July 1, 1964,
834 U.N.T.S. 107, and to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods
(“ULIS”), July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169, contained no more than quasi-prede-
cessors, which were functionally equivalent, but had a significantly different
language and structure. See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra
note 27, at 118.
110. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Second Committee to the Conference
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/12 (Apr.
1, 1980), reprinted in Official Records, supra note 47, at 141, 145.
111. Official Records, supra note 47, at 439.
112. New Article C bis, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/l.4 (Apr. 7, 1980), reprinted in
Official Records, supra note 47, at 170.
113. Official Records, supra note 47, at 229.
114. Id. at 230.
115. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 118; Evans,
supra note 76, at 648, para. 2.3; Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 468 n.52
(“In the face of the threat of non-adaption by Eastern European States, the
Conference ultimately inserted Article 95 . . . .”).
116. See Peter Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on International
Sales Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
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about its precise meaning that plague the provision’s practical
application to this very day.117
3. Authorization and Use of the CISG’s Reservations
Finally, it is worth noting that all reservations authorized by
the CISG have actually been used by one or more Contracting
States. In this respect, the CISG differs from many other uni-
form law conventions whose text authorizes reservations that
later turned out to be superfluous, as no State saw the need to
declare such a reservation upon accession.118 The fact that such
“orphan reservations” are relatively common under other con-
ventions proves the excellent draftsmanship of the CISG, where
reservations were successfully restricted to the necessary mini-
mum.
II. RESERVATIONS: DECREASINGUNIFORMITY OR ENABLING A
WIDERUNIFORMITY?
In looking back on the role that reservations have played dur-
ing the first thirty-five years of the CISG’s practical application,
it is helpful to commence with a general, bird’s-eye assessment,
before turning to some more specific questions.119
A. The Critical View: Reservations as a Source of Nonuni-
formity
Taking the opinions expressed in legal writings as a starting
point, it quickly becomes clear that the prevailing view of the
CISG’s reservations is a skeptical or even outright critical one.
Most of the critique has been directed at one and the same factor,
namely the reservations’ perceived nature as a source of nonu-
niformity under the Sales Convention.120 The impact of such
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS ch. 1, at 44 (Nina
Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984).
117. For further detail about such uncertainties, see CISG Advisory Council
Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 120–23.
118. The United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, June 14, 1974, 1511 U.N.T.S. 3, is one of many exam-
ples. Out of the five reservations authorized by the Limitation Convention, only
one (Article 34) was used by a single Contracting State (Norway). Id.
119. See infra Parts III, IV.
120. Camilla B. Andersen, Recent Removals of Reservations under the Inter-
national Sales Law: Winds of Change Heralding a Greater Unity of the CISG,
8 J. BUS. L. 698, 706 (2012); Andersen, supra note 26, at 1–2; Bailey, supra
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nonuniformity has been viewed as considerable,121 even under-
mining the Sales Convention’s very goal of creating a uniform
law of international sales.122 Related points of criticism are the
increased likelihood of confusion regarding the CISG’s practical
application123 and the resulting additional transaction costs.124
The critical view’s essential thrust, however, remains nonuni-
formity. The presence of reservations means that the search for
a uniform solution has partially failed.
B. A More Positive View: Reservations as a Tool Enabling a
Wider Uniformity
On the eve of the Sales Convention’s thirty-fifth birthday, the
present article offers an alternative and more positive view of
the CISG’s reservation regime. It rests on two separate founda-
tions that differ from those used by the prevailing view. On one
hand, it takes into account recent developments regarding the
use of reservations by Contracting States125 (which admittedly
could not be taken into account by most earlier writers—in this
respect, it may be accused of profiting from the benefit of hind-
sight). On the other hand, it challenges the standard of uni-
formity implicitly underlying the general criticism of reserva-
tions by asking: reduced uniformity compared to what?126
In a nutshell, the result of this combined approach can be de-
scribed as follows: the use of reservations under uniform private
law conventions like the CISG should not be viewed as a source
note 40, at 311; Ferrari, supra note 40, at 951, para. 9; Flechtner, supra
note 40, at 193; Sarah Howard Jenkins, Construing Laws Governing Interna-
tional and U.S. Domestic Contracts for the Sale of Goods: A Comparative Eval-
uation of the CISG and UCC Rules of Interpretation, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 181, 202 (2012); Mazzotta, supra note 40, at 836; Thomas Neumann, The
Continued Saga of the CISG in the Nordic Countries: Reservations and Trans-
formation Reconsidered, 1 NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 2 (2013). For an analysis from
a general treaty law perspective, see Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J.
INT’L LAW 307, 330 (2006).
121. Flechtner, supra note 40, at 197.
122. Bailey, supra note 40, at 312.
123. Id. at 311.
124. Rolf Knieper, Celebrating Success by Accession to CISG, 25 J.L. & COM.
447, 478–79 (2006); Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 469.
125. See infra Part III.B.1.
126. See infra III.B.2.a. This question has also been raised in a more general
context by Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 480 (“Criticism of the CISG re-
quires an answer to the question: compared to what?”).
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of nonuniformity, but is more fittingly regarded as a tool ena-
bling what may be called a “wider uniformity.”
1. Taking into Account the Withdrawability of Reservations
The first justification for the present approach emerges when
taking into account the possibility of withdrawing reservations,
as provided for in the law of treaties in general (Article 22 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and in Arti-
cle 97(4) CISG in particular. A reservation, once made, does not
need to stay in effect forever, but can also result in a merely tem-
poral reduction of uniformity. The recent wave of withdrawals of
some or all of the CISG reservations that we have witnessed
since 2011 in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, the People’s
Republic of China, Lithuania, Norway, and Hungary,127 has re-
minded us of the inherent temporal scope of reservations under
uniform private law conventions. While in the past, reservation
withdrawals had played almost no practical role under such con-
ventions, as reservations usually remained unmodified until the
respective State eventually denounced the Convention,128 the
CISG—once again—has been a ground breaker in this regard.
The withdrawability of reservations serves a useful function in
the circumstances in which a State contemplating the ratifica-
tion of or accession to a uniform private law convention finds
certain provisions contained therein objectionable or contesta-
ble. In the case of uniform private law conventions, this is most
likely to be the case where the convention dramatically departs
from the State’s domestic law.129 A critical approach towards
some of the Convention’s content complicates the respective
State’s position towards the Convention, in that it renders its
decision for or against a consent to be bound (Article 11 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) more diffi-
cult.130 In such a context, the option to ratify a convention in
combination with making a withdrawable reservation offers the
127. For details on this wave of withdrawals, see Schroeter, supra note 17, at
2–3; Ulrich G. Schroeter, The Withdrawal of Hungary’s Declarations Under the
CISG – Law and Policy, in INTERNATIONALESHANDELSRECHT 210 (2015).
128. Schroeter, supra note 17, at 2; see also FRANKHORN, RESERVATIONS AND
INTERPRETATIVEDECLARATIONS TOMULTILATERALTREATIES 226 (1988) (describ-
ing reservation withdrawals as “a rare event” in general treaty practice); Wal-
ter, supra note 10, art. 22 para. 1.
129. Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 467; see also infra Part III.B.2.b.
130. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
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hesitant State the possibility to “test drive” the convention. In
doing so, it can experience the convention’s application in prac-
tice, without immediately having to commit to provisions it at
first sight finds objectionable. At the same time, “opting out” of
these provisions by way of a reservation is not necessarily made
for eternity, as the reservation may be withdrawn “at any
time.”131
This option may be more attractive to reluctant States than
the obvious alternative, namely to refrain from immediate rati-
fication of the Convention and to observe the development “from
the outside,” i.e., the position of a non-Contracting State, before
potentially ratifying at a later stage. One reason is that an early
ratification (despite being accompanied by reservations) still
brings the economic advantages that flow from the nonreserved
parts of the Convention132 to the reserving State’s citizens and
companies, while an abstention deprives them of these ad-
vantages. Another reason may lie in a Contracting State’s
chance to influence the early interpretation of the Convention
through its domestic courts, which will have the opportunity to
play their part in the proverbial international “orchestra” made
up of courts from all Contracting States.133 This may be viewed
as more advantageous than remaining a non-Contracting State
with the prospect of later ratifying the Convention including the
interpretation it has already received at that stage, and that the
new Contracting State will nevertheless need to “have regard to”
131. Under the Convention,
[a]ny State which makes a declaration under this Convention may
withdraw it at any time by a formal notification in writing addressed
to the depositary. Such withdrawal is to take effect on the first day of
the month following the expiration of six months after the date of the
receipt of the notification by the depositary.
CISG, supra note 4, art. 97(4).
132. For detailed background information on this point, see Spagnolo, supra
note 14, at 47–148.
133. The picture of an “orchestra without conductor” was employed in Peter
Schlechtriem, Einheitskaufrecht in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshof
[Uniform Sales Law in the Decisions of the Bundesgerichshof], in 50 JAHRE
BUNDESGERICHTSHOF: FESTGABE AUS DER WISSENSCHAFT [50 YEARS OF THE
BUNDESGERICHTSHOF: A CELEBRATION ANTHOLOGY FROM THE ACADEMIC
COMMUNITY] 407, 408 (Claus-Wilhelm Canaris et al. eds., 2000).
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in accordance with Article 7(1) CISG as well as Article 31(3)(b)
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.134
As a first intermediate result, we can therefore identify a cru-
cial difference between the treaty law perspective and the uni-
form private law perspective. From the viewpoint of general
treaty law, a reservation expresses a “no,” while from the view-
point of contemporary uniform private law it often merely ex-
presses a “not yet.” This difference is further corroborated by
State practice under the Sales Convention where most reserva-
tions were declared during the early years (and none since
2008)—a result that stands in contrast to observations under
general treaty practice, where latecomers to treaties have been
found to make more reservations than early ratifiers.135
2. Reservations and Treaty Design: A “Wider Uniformity” Un-
der “Reservable” Uniform Private Law Conventions
In addition, it will be argued in the following section that the
use of reservations in fact enables a “wider uniformity” under
uniform private law conventions, thereby not hindering uni-
formity, but rather contributing to it. In this context, it is first
necessary to define the appropriate standard of uniformity,136
before addressing a number of treaty design particularities that
affect themaking of uniform private law conventions and accord-
ingly the use of reservations in such conventions.137 Finally, a
number of further advantages of reservations in a treaty-design
context will be discussed.138
a. Measuring Uniformity: Selecting the Appropriate Standard
We next turn to the standard of uniformity that should be used
when measuring the effect of reservations. Insofar, the prevail-
ing view that labels reservations a source of nonuniformity139
implicitly employs a complete uniformity within the scope of the
convention as the standard of comparison. As far as a uniform
134. See supra Part I.B.
135. See Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and
Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 367, 370 (2006); Swaine, supra note 120, at
342 n.210.
136. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
137. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
138. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
139. See supra Part III.A.
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law text has been agreed upon, it should ideally be applied iden-
tically in all Contracting States thereto, and reservations are
disturbing this uniformity. At the opposite end of the range of
possible standards lies another uniformity standard which is
equally radical, namely a complete lack of uniformity within the
scope of the convention. If we picture a uniform law text that has
been adopted with a content that no State is willing to accept
unmodified, then all reservations would be a good thing, as they
would make the convention more acceptable to States140 and
would therefore be a source of uniformity, because the conven-
tion otherwise would attract no Contracting States. (This picture
is, of course, somewhat unrealistic, as such a uniform law text
would probably not have been adopted in the first place.)141
It is submitted that both of these “radical” standards—com-
plete uniformity and complete nonuniformity—are overly sim-
plistic and should be replaced by a standard that is more attuned
to the realities of uniform private lawmaking. In this context,
the perspective should also be widened by looking beyond the
scope of the adopted uniform law texts. Their scope could have
been different had reservations been used when the respective
text was drafted, which already indicates that reservations may
well enable a “wider” uniformity.
b. Treaty Design Particularities Affecting Uniform Private Law
Conventions
i. Reservations and Treaty Negotiations
As a starting point, it is useful to recall an issue in which uni-
form private lawmaking differs from treaty lawmaking in gen-
eral.142 In case of other treaties, the adoption of the treaty text
in accordance with Article 9 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties is followed by a decision-making process in
140. See Knieper, supra note 124, at 479.
141. There are, however, conventions that were formally adopted and at-
tracted almost no State parties, such as the European Convention Providing a
Uniform Law on Arbitration, Jan. 20, 1966, E.T.S. No. 56, which was only
signed by two States (Austria and Belgium) and ratified by one State (Belgium,
subject to reservations). The Convention never entered into force. Details of
Treaty No. 056: European Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitra-
tion, COUNSEL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/con-
ventions/treaty/056 (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
142. See supra Part II.B.1.
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the individual States, during which each State decides whether
or not to express its consent to be bound by the treaty143 and—
most important in our context—which reservations to make,
thereby potentially “turning a prix fixe menu à la carte.”144
In the case of uniform private law conventions, however, the
freedom tomake reservations is often muchmore limited, as pro-
visions like Article 98 CISG145 typically restrict the possible con-
tent of reservations to those expressly authorized in the conven-
tion.146 This in turn leads to the discussion about admissible res-
ervations already taking place during the phase preceding the
uniform law text’s adoption, with reservations forming part and
parcel of the general treaty negotiations.147 The drafting of res-
ervations under uniform private law conventions is therefore in-
trinsically tied to the drafting of the uniform law text they relate
to, and both endeavors closely interact with each other.
ii. Reservations Versus Other Design Options
Against this uniform private lawmaking background, reserva-
tions do not necessarily appear as an impediment to uniformity,
but rather as a tool that provides a sensible design option in ad-
dition to those otherwise available.148 A situation in which these
options need to be compared arises every time that an agreement
about the content of a uniform law text cannot be reached, usu-
ally because the various domestic laws dealing with the respec-
tive topic differ to such an extent that delegates cannot agree on
a universally acceptable compromise text.149 The existence of dif-
ferences between domestic laws in itself is not surprising, as it
constitutes the prerequisite for uniform private lawmaking
(though not necessarily for treaty making in general150). Wher-
ever all domestic laws have developed the same solution for a
salient problem, there is no need for a uniform law in the first
place, as it could do no more than codifying the already uniform
143. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 11.
144. Swaine, supra note 120, at 307.
145. See supra Parts II.A.2.a., II.B.1.
146. Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 98 para. 1. In other types of treaties,
provisions of this kind are much less common. See Gregory F. Jacob, Without
Reservation, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 287, 291 (2004); Swaine, supra note 120, at 325.
147. See supra Part II.B.1.
148. Cf. Helfer, supra note 135, at 378.
149. Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 460.
150. See JAMESK. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 113 (1984).
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solution through a uniform wording, thereby adding uniformity
in form to the existing uniformity in substance. Uniform law-
making efforts therefore necessarily presuppose that local ap-
proaches to a certain problem differ, and that any uniform law
solution, whatever its content, will accordingly require some of
the States involved to accept a text that is at least partially “for-
eign” to them. In such a situation, a number of different options
are at the uniform lawmakers’ disposal.
Many controversies about the desirable uniform law solution
may be solved through negotiations that eventually lead to a
compromise acceptable to most or all of the drafters. A promi-
nent example from the Sales Convention’s drafting history was
the much-discussed regulation of the buyer’s notice of noncon-
formity, which resulted in a compromise solution combining a
comparatively strict rule (Articles 39 and 43 CISG) with limited
exceptions (Articles 40 and 44 CISG).151
It is in situations in which no commonly acceptable compro-
mise text can be agreed upon that a choice must be made be-
tween a narrower and a wider controversial text,152 which
amounts to a choice between a “narrower” or a “wider” uni-
formity. A “narrower” uniformity results from decisions to ex-
clude the controversial issue(s) from the scope of the uniform
text, thereby leaving it nonunified. This type of solution guaran-
tees that no State is repelled from accepting the uniform text
because of an unacceptable wording, but at the same time re-
stricts the text’s scope within which uniformity can develop.
When the Sales Convention was drafted, this approach was used
with respect to the material “validity” of the sales contract, as
no compromise about an acceptable text could be reached.153 The
resulting “validity exception” in Article 4 sentence 2(a) CISG ac-
cordingly excludes this matter from the Convention’s material
151. See E.E. Bergsten (Rapporteur), Examination of the Goods and Notice
of Non-Conformity–Articles 38 and 39, Advisory Opinion No. 2, CISG Advisory
Council, cmts. 1–3.5 (June 2004), reprinted in 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 377; Gil-
lette & Scott, supra note 15, at 460.
152. Helfer, supra note 135, at 375 (stressing the “broad freedom of interna-
tional contract” in negotiating treaties).
153. SeeHelen E. Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception
to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 22–45 (1993).
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scope, although the meaning of this provision has in itself cre-
ated much controversy.154
In contrast, a “wider” uniformity is chosen whenever a contro-
versial issue is covered in the uniform law text but accompanied
by an authorized reservation that allows States to “opt out” of
the compromise found. As such, reservations may later be with-
drawn; this approach enables a wider uniformity by way of a
more comprehensive scope of the convention155—proof that res-
ervations may in fact serve the goal of private law unification.
c. Further Advantages of Reservations in a Treaty Design Con-
text
In addition, the use of reservations offers a number of further
advantages, all of which eventually support the quest for uni-
formity. First, it allows for a more ambitious and “deeper”156
level of content in the uniform private law text concerned, which
in the long term results in a wider uniformity than the alterna-
tive exclusion of controversial issues.157 The freedom-of-form
question constitutes an example from the Sales Convention’s
drafting history. Although the efficient158 freedom-of-form prin-
ciple was unacceptable as a universally applicable rule to the
Socialist planned economies when the Convention was drafted
in the 1970s,159 it was eventually included in Articles 11 and 29
CISG, but accompanied by an authorized reservation (Article 96
CISG). The formal validity of sales contracts thereby became a
matter governed by the Convention, with the resulting preemp-
tion of domestic laws.160 Although the freedom-of-form principle
was initially affected by the numerous reservations under Arti-
154. See U.G. Schroeter, The Validity of International Sales Contracts: Irrel-
evance of the “Validity Exception” in Article 4 Vienna Sales Convention and a
Novel Approach to Determining the Convention’s Scope, in 11 BOUNDARIES AND
INTERSECTIONS 95–117 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2014).
155. But see Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 461.
156. Swaine, supra note 120, at 311, 331.
157. For a similar argument in relation to treaties in general, see Helfer, su-
pra note 135, at 368, 378; Swaine, supra note 120, at 331–33.
158. For an efficiency assessment from a law and economics perspective, see
Mark Cantora, The CISG After Medellin v. Texas, 8 J. INT’LBUS. & L. 111, 125–
27 (2009); Spagnolo, supra note 14, at 81.
159. See Schroeter, The Cross-Border Freedom of Form Principle Under Res-
ervation, supra note 27, at 81–83.
160. See SCHLECHTRIEM& SCHROETER, supra note 20, paras. 112–13.
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cle 96 CISG that were made, a significant number of these res-
ervations have since been withdrawn.161 Had the drafters of the
Convention opted for a narrower scope of the uniform sales law
excluding the issue of formal validity, the degree of uniformity
would be significantly lower today.
Second, the use of reservations can eventually be advanta-
geous to uniformity if it can solicit additional ratifications
through a limited option to reserve. For example, by authorizing
the nonapplication of one provision (Article 1(1)(b) CISG), Arti-
cle 95 CISG enables the application of the other eighty-seven
provisions in Parts I–III of the Sales Convention; a compromise
that may well pass for a “good deal.”
Third, any decision in favor of a “wider” uniformity accounts
for the fact that reservations—because of their withdrawabil-
ity162—are a more flexible component of uniform international
law when compared to the convention’s text itself. Once it has
been adopted and ratified by a relevant number of States, a uni-
form private law convention cannot realistically be modified.163
In contrast, the position of an initially hesitant reserving State
can be modified, namely through the withdrawal of its reserva-
tion.
d. Conclusion
As a second intermediate result, we can accordingly conclude
that a more ambitiously framed uniform private law text in com-
bination with authorized reservations eventually results in a
“wider” uniformity than a narrower uniform private law text
without reservations. Insofar, reservations serve as a tool con-
tributing to the international unification of laws.
3. Limits
There are, however, inherent limits to the use of reservations
as a tool to enable wider uniformity. These limits are on the one
hand reached whenever an authorized reservation is built “for
eternity” (and will accordingly never be withdrawn), as such res-
ervations do not aim at providing a mere “test drive”164 of the
new uniform law convention. To a certain extent, Article 93
161. See supra Part III.B.1.
162. See supra Part III.B.1.
163. SCHROETER, supra note 23, § 13 para. 60.
164. See supra Part III.B.1.
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CISG falls into this category to be addressed in more detail be-
low.165 On the other hand, the more positive view proposed here
does not apply to reservations that are so far reaching as
amounting to a rejection of the uniform law’s content in disguise:
little is gained by adding a Contracting State that has opted out
of too much, creating the risk that the entire convention “may
ultimately be perceived as a mere sham, form with no sub-
stance.”166
A prominent example of the latter type of reservation was Ar-
ticle V of the 1964 Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law
on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS). It read:
Any State may, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of
ratification of or accession to the present Convention declare,
by a notification addressed to the Government of the Nether-
lands, that it will apply the Uniform Law only to contracts in
which the parties thereto have, by virtue of Article 4 of the Uni-
form Law, chosen that Law as the law of the contract.167
Under the 1964 Hague Convention, the United Kingdom and the
Gambia both made use of this reservation. The effect has been
striking; although the 1964 Convention has been in force for
both countries since 1972 and 1974 respectively and still is in
force today, not a single case has ever been reported from the
United Kingdom or the Gambia in which the ULIS was applied.
The reason is that—according to Article V—the ULIS applies to
a contract of sale only if it has been specifically chosen by the
parties to the contract as the law thereof, and such a positive
choice is hardly ever made in practice.168 The reservation has
rendered the 1964 Uniform Sales Law accordingly meaningless
in the two reserving States.
165. See infra Part V.B.
166. Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 469.
167. Unif. Law on the Int’l Sale of Goods art. 5 (UNIDROIT, 1964).
168. DICEY, MORRIS& COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS para. 33-019 (15th
ed. 2012). Interestingly, contractual clauses specifically choosing the CISG as
the applicable law are now becoming more and more common in practice. See,
e.g., Case No. 13184 of 2011, 36 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 96, 101 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.)
(“This agreement shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
and, as to matters not addressed in that Convention, by and in accordance with
Mexican law applicable in Mexico City . . . .”).
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At the 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vienna, proposals were
nevertheless made to include a reservation in the Sales Conven-
tion similar to the one mentioned above.169 In its support, the
Australian delegate suggested that the reservation would give
businesses an opportunity to move gradually and by their own
decision make the Convention apply to their contracts, but nev-
ertheless wouldmaximize the number of States which would rat-
ify the Convention.170 Luckily, the proposals met with over-
whelming opposition and were eventually rejected. In support of
their rejection, delegates in Vienna pointed out that States using
this type of “opting in” reservation would in consequence have
almost no obligations under the Convention171 and could hardly
be counted as Contracting States.172 And indeed, in view of their
extent, reservations of the type described do not qualify as tools
enabling a wider uniformity of uniform private law, irrespective
of their withdrawability. In fact, they would arguably go beyond
being sources of some nonuniformity by “upset[ting] the whole
process of progress toward the unification of private law”173—a
situation that should be avoided.
III. DIFFICULTIES IN PRACTICEUNDER THE CONVENTION
Even if reservations are viewed as a merely temporary re-
striction of the Convention’s applicability,174 reservations tem-
porarily made affect the Convention’s practical application until
they are withdrawn. In this context, as the Nordic Article 92 res-
ervations175 demonstrate, “temporarily” may well mean twenty-
two years or more. It is therefore of interest to briefly evaluate
the practical effects that the CISG’s reservations have had in the
past thirty-five years.
In evaluating these practical effects, the focus will once more
not be on the way in which each reservation has resulted in the
nonapplication of certain CISG provisions, but rather on general
169. Official Records, supra note 47, at 144.
170. Id. at 437.
171. Id. at 438.
172. Id. at 437.
173. Id. at 438; accordWinship, supra note 116, at 48–49.
174. See infra Part III.B.1.
175. See infra Part III.B.1.; Andersen, supra note 26, at 9–10; Andersen, su-
pra note 120, at 708. See generally Neumann, supra note 26 (discussing the
Nordic reservations, as well as the temporal issues they implicate).
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difficulties that have emerged in practice. As will be demon-
strated, all of these difficulties can essentially be traced back to
one and the same reason, namely the nature of reservations as
instruments of treaty law that affect the application of uniform
sales law to contracts between private parties.176
A. Reservations Overlooked by Courts
In a number of cases, courts simply overlooked CISG reserva-
tions that should have been taken into account in deciding cases.
A reason for these mistakes may have been the position of res-
ervations that are tucked away in the far corners of the Sales
Convention, in the Part titled “Final Clauses” that may seem as
if directed at government officers only. In this respect, another
prominent convention in the area of international commerce—
the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards—is structured somewhat dif-
ferently, as its drafters positioned two of the reservations au-
thorized thereunder (the “reciprocity reservation” and the “com-
mercial reservation”) directly in Article I(3) of the New York
Convention.177 This approach made these reservations more dif-
ficult to overlook, as they form part and parcel of the Conven-
tion’s introductory provision. In contrast, courts have to read the
Sales Convention’s text from beginning to end, because its Arti-
cle 1 does not explicitly refer to the reservations in Articles 92–
95 CISG—a factor which may well affect the Convention’s appli-
cation.178
Another factor that appears to affect relevant court practice is
the court’s location inside or outside a reserving State. Reserva-
tions have been more frequently overlooked by courts in Con-
tracting States that had not themselves made a reservation, but
were called upon to apply the Sales Convention in constellations
176. See supra Part I.A.
177. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. I(3), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
178. But see CISG, supra note 4, art. 12. Article 12 CISG largely duplicates
the language of Article 96 CISG in order “to draw attention to the fact that [the
freedom-of-form rule in Article 11 CISG] might be affected by a reservation.”
HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 186 n.2.
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in which they had to take a reservation made by another Con-
tracting State179 into account.180 This phenomenon is not entirely
surprising, as it is in conformity with observations from general
treaty practice where reservations made by other States are fre-
quently given less attention than reservations declared by the
home State.181 An explanation in the context of uniform law con-
ventions is that a reserving State’s government will take better
care to provide its domestic courts with information about the
reservations it has declared than about foreign reservations—
when it comes to reservations of the latter kind, courts are often
required to make do with information published by the conven-
tion’s depositary.
Nevertheless, reservations have also occasionally been over-
looked by a reserving State’s own domestic courts.182 And finally,
179. Reservations authorized by Articles 92, 93, 94, and 96 CISG (but not the
one authorized by Article 95 CISG) must be observed by courts in all Contract-
ing States, although this is highly disputed. See Schroeter, supra note 21,
at 444–47.
180. See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Naumburg,
Apr. 27, 1999, 9 U 146/98,
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=510&step=FullText
(overlooking the Danish Article 92 CISG reservation); Oberlandesgericht
[OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Frankfurt am Main, Mar. 4, 1994, 10 U 80/93,
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=205&step=FullText
(Ger.) (overlooking the Swedish Article 92 CISG reservation). For a critical as-
sessment of these decisions, see M.M. Fogt, Rechtzeitige Rüge und Vertragsauf-
hebung bei Waren mit raschem Wertverlust nach UN-Kaufrecht [Timely Com-
plaint and Termination of the Contract for Goods with a Rapid Loss of Value
by the CISG], 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜREUROPÄISCHESPRIVATRECHT [J. EUR. PRIV. L.]
580, 587 n.22 (2002).
181. Swaine, supra note 120, at 327.
182. See Oberlandesgerichte [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dϋsseldorf, July
2, 1993, 17 U 73/93 (Ger.), translated in 16 J.L. &COM. 357 (1997). In this case,
the Court did not address the interpretative declaration regarding the appli-
cation of Article 95 CISG that has been made by Germany. This declaration
reads as follows:
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany holds the view
that Parties to the Convention that have made a declaration under
article 95 of the Convention are not considered Contracting States
within the meaning of subparagraph (a) (b) of article 1 of the Conven-
tion. Accordingly, there is no obligation to apply – and the Federal
Republic of Germany assumes no obligation to apply – this provision
when the rules of private international law lead to the application of
the law of a Party that has made a declaration to the effect that it will
not be bound by subparagraph (1) (b) of article 1 of the Convention.
240 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
there have been cases in which courts have noticed the possible
effect of a foreign reservation, but refused to address the matter
ex officio because the parties had failed to raise the CISG’s ap-
plicability to the dispute.183
B. Uncertainty Created By Reservations
In cases in which reservations were not outright overlooked by
courts, the primary difficulty in practice has been a frequent un-
certainty about a reservation’s meaning. Uncertainty of this
kind has demonstrated itself both in the context of the making
of reservations by States184 and, maybe even more important, of
court and arbitral proceedings applying the Sales Convention to
sales contracts.185
1. Uncertainty Affecting Contracting States Making a Reserva-
tion
The first group to be affected by uncertainty about reserva-
tions are government officials in States that are about to ratify,
accept, approve, or accede to the Sales Convention. In spite of
John Honnold’s confident statement that “[t]hese matters are
handled by government officers who have experience with simi-
lar provisions in other conventions,”186 there have been indica-
tions that the making of reservations is occasionally a matter of
difficulty. The CISG itself provides little guidance in this re-
spect: Article 98 CISG limits reservations to those expressly au-
thorized in the Convention, and Article 97 CISG addresses for-
mal aspects187 of declarations to be made under the Convention’s
final provisions. The actual wording of reservations, on the con-
trary, has traditionally been left to the reserving State’s officials,
and the Sales Convention continues this tradition by giving
them no orientation apart from the language of Articles 92–96
CISG.
Subject to this observation the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany makes no declaration under article 95 of the Convention.
183. Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 447 (3d Cir.
2003); see also Spagnolo, supra note 14, at 285–97.
184. See infra Part IV.B.1.
185. See infra Part IV.B.2.
186. HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 691–92, para. 458.
187. Id.
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Where the language of these provisions contains uncertainties
(even if only in the eyes of the government official concerned),
these uncertainties may result in the making of unclear reser-
vations.188Under the Sales Convention, a much-discussed exam-
ple was the reservation against oral contracts made by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in 1986 (but since withdrawn),189 which
deviated from the language of Article 96 CISG, albeit in only mi-
nor respects.190 A both more recent and more intriguing example
is the second191 Armenian declaration made by the Republic of
Armenia upon its accession to the Sales Convention in 2008. It
reads:
Pursuant to Article 95 of the Convention, the Republic of Ar-
menia declares that it will not apply the Article 1, subpara-
graph (1)(b) of the Convention to the parties that declare not to
be bound by the Article 1, subparagraph (1)(b) of the Conven-
tion.
The meaning of this declaration is not entirely clear, and its
wording is quite obviously not in conformity with Article 95
CISG, despite its express reference to this provision. While one
can only speculate about the precise purpose and historical back-
ground of the declaration, it can be surmised that its drafters
were uncertain about the meaning of Article 95 CISG and there-
fore attempted to provide a clarification in their declaration. In
doing so, they may have overlooked Article 98 CISG. (Note that
Armenia on the same occasion also entered a reservation against
oral contracts, and that the wording of this declaration was
framed in perfect conformity with Article 96 CISG.)
It is a somewhat unfortunate effect of the unclear Armenian
declaration (as of any other unclear declaration) that the uncer-
tainty that affected government officials is thereby transferred
into private practice under the Convention, with courts and ar-
188. See Schroeter, supra note 21, at 449–52.
189. See infra Part III.B.1.
190. See Xiaolin Wang & Camilla B. Andersen, The Chinese Declaration
Against Oral Contracts Under the CISG, 18 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. 145,
146 (2004); Schroeter, supra note 21, at 450–51.
191. The first Armenian declaration was made when Armenia deposited an
instrument of accession in 2006, but subsequently withdrew its declaration of
accession before the Sales Convention could enter into force for Armenia. See
Schroeter, supra note 21, at 449–50. Interestingly, this first declaration also
had an unclear content. See id.
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bitral tribunals having to determine the declaration’s precise ef-
fect.192 A pragmatic solution would be to simply apply the decla-
ration in full accordance with its wording, as supported by Arti-
cle 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
This would probably mean that the Armenian “Article 95-style”
reservation would have no scope in practice, as it must be con-
sidered highly unlikely that the parties to any sales contract will
ever expressly declare not to be bound by Article 1(1)(b) CISG,
as the reservation’s wording presupposes. Arguably, this result
would not even be an undesirable outcome, as it would leave the
Sales Convention’s scope of application unaffected.
2. Uncertainty Affecting Judges and Arbitrators
Throughout practice under the Sales Convention, the more im-
portant group affected by reservation-induced uncertainty are
judges, arbitrators, and attorneys advising buyers or sellers.
a. General
While the uncertainty of this group may on occasion be caused
by the specific wording of individual Contracting States’ decla-
rations,193 it is more often created by Articles 92–96 CISG them-
selves. The reason can again be traced to the dual character of
reservations under uniform private law conventions, being both
creatures of treaty law and of uniform private law at the same
time.194 It is the resulting need of judges at civil and commercial
courts to also handle the treaty law side of reservations that may
give rise to difficulties. Even experienced judges are presumably
puzzled when faced with provisions that were drawn up against
a public international law background, with the obligations of
States as sovereign entities in mind.
b. Uncertainty Under Specific CISG Reservations
The experience of thirty-five years demonstrates, however,
that the risk of uncertainty is not the same under each of the
CISG’s reservations. It rather depends on the manner in which
the reservations were drafted, and notably the care that was
taken in spelling out their effect upon the Convention’s applica-
tion to individual sales contracts. In this respect, the numerical
192. See also Schroeter, supra note 21, at 451–52.
193. See supra Part IV.B.1.
194. See supra Part I.A.
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order of Articles 92–96 CISG happens to correspond to the easi-
ness in which the reservations have been applied by courts and
arbitral tribunals, with an imaginary curve commencing with
the two easiest-to-apply (Articles 92 and 93 CISG) and making
its way downhill via an intermediate degree of easiness (Arti-
cle 94 CISG) towards the reservations that have caused the most
difficulties (Articles 95 and 96 CISG).
i. Articles 92 and 93 CISG
A prize for excellent drafting goes to Article 92 CISG, which
reads:
(1) A Contracting State may declare at the time of signature,
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not
be bound by Part II of this Convention or that it will not be
bound by Part III of this Convention.
(2) A Contracting State which makes a declaration in accord-
ance with the preceding paragraph in respect of Part II or Part
III of this Convention is not to be considered a Contracting
State within paragraph (1) of article 1 of this Convention in
respect of matters governed by the Part to which the declara-
tion applies.195
Article 92 CISG is divided into two paragraphs, with Arti-
cle 92(1) CISG addressing the public international law side of
the reservation (“that it [i.e. the reserving State] will not be
bound by”)196 and Article 92(2) CISG clearly stipulating the res-
ervation’s effect upon the Convention’s application in private
court cases (in which the reserving State is not to be considered
a Contracting State when the court applies Article 1(1) CISG).
Article 92(2) CISG is therefore drafted to specifically address
courts and arbitral tribunals and prevents them from having to
“translate” a reservation framed in treaty law terminology into
a rule that works in the context of the Sales Convention’s sphere
of application.197
Article 93 CISG has a similar, although slightly more compli-
cated structure, within which Article 93(3) CISG fulfils the same
195. CISG, supra note 4, art. 92.
196. Id.
197. See Schroeter, supra note 21, at 431.
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function as Article 92(2) CISG.198 It is worth noting that a para-
graph comparable to Article 93(3) CISG was still missing in the
older federal state clause in Article 31 of the 1974 United Na-
tions Convention on the Limitation Period in the International
Sale of Goods, which only addressed the public international law
side of the reservation. After this was noted, today’s Article 93(3)
CISG was added during the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference
with an aim toward “providing a gloss for the term ‘Contracting
State’ in relation to the federal State clause . . . something that
had been omitted in the 1974 Limitation Convention.”199 On the
same occasion, the Limitation Convention was revised by way of
a 1980 Protocol, and a similar paragraph was included in its Ar-
ticle 31(4).
ii. Article 94 CISG
In comparison, Article 94 CISG remained without a clear coun-
terpart to Articles 92(2) and 93(3) CISG. Instead, Article 94(1)
and (2) CISG adopted a primary focus on the reservation’s public
international law component by providing that Contracting
State(s) “may at any time declare that the Convention is not to
apply to contracts of sale or to their formation where . . . .”200 The
reservation’s effect in practice is only addressed indirectly by the
words “that the Convention is not to apply,” which has resulted
in a heated dispute whether an Article 94 reservation needs to
be observed only by courts in a reserving State201 or by all courts
applying the Convention.202 A clear provision along the lines of
Articles 92(2) and 93(3) CISG could have prevented this uncer-
tainty from emerging in the first place.
iii. Articles 95 and 96 CISG
Article 95 CISG was drafted even more one-sided when it pro-
vides that “[a]ny State may declare at the time of the deposit of
198. Id. at 445. For a discussion of the slight difference in the language of
Article 92(2) CISG and Article 93(3) CISG, see supra Part II.A.2.b.
199. Official Records, supra note 47, at 445.
200. CISG, supra note 4, art. 94(1), (2).
201. De Ly, supra note 80, at 10; Ferrari, supra note 40, art. 94 para. 3; ROLF
HERBER & BEATE CZERWENKA, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT 397–98, para. 8
(1991); Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 94 para. 14.
202. Flechtner, supra note 40, at 194; HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 38 para.
47; Magnus, supra note 40, art. 94 para. 7; Schlechtriem et al., supra note 38,
at 1171–72; Schroeter, supra note 21, at 444–45; Torsello, supra note 40, at 97.
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its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1 of
this Convention.”203 Couched in classical public international
law terms,204 Article 95 CISG thereby merely excludes the re-
serving State’s duty under public international law to apply Ar-
ticle 1(1)(b) CISG,205 but entirely fails to specify what this means
for the Convention’s application by courts and arbitral tribunals.
This uncertainty, which can be traced to the provision’s last-mi-
nute addition206 and the resulting lack of scrutiny at the drafting
stage,207 has given rise to extensive discussions among CISG
commentators.208
The same essentially applies to the reservation of Article 96
CISG, albeit in a slightly different way. In Article 12 CISG, Ar-
ticle 96 CISG is even being accompanied by a sister provision
placed in Part I of the Sales Convention, which is clearly directed
at courts in Contracting States and maybe also at arbitral tribu-
nals.209 The language of Article 12 CISG, however, was appar-
ently not drafted sufficiently clearly in that it uses an expression
similar to Article 94(1), (2) CISG—“does not apply” in Article 12
CISG, as opposed to “is not to apply” in Article 94(1), (2)
CISG210—and has in consequence given rise to a similar amount
of academic dispute, as well as divergent case law.211 As a result,
Articles 95 and 96 CISG may eventually have caused more un-
certainty than the other three CISG reservations combined.212
203. CISG, supra note 4, art. 95.
204. Schroeter, supra note 21, at 440.
205. See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 26, at 120–21
cmts. 3.17–19.
206. See supra Part II.B.2.
207. Gary F. Bell, Why Singapore Should Withdraw Its Reservation to the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG), 9 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 55, 62 (2005); Schroeter, supra note 21, at 431.
208. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 116 cmts. 3.12–
17.
209. Whether the Sales Convention is, in a technical sense, directly ad-
dressed at arbitral tribunals is a difficult question. For additional information
on this topic, see SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHROETER, supra note 20, para. 33; Nils
Schmidt-Ahrendts, CISG and Arbitration, 2011 BELGRADE L. REV. 211, 213
(2011).
210. HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 187 para. 129 (admitting that the language
of Article 12 CISG “is difficult to parse”).
211. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 116, cmts.
4.15–20.
212. See generally id.
246 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
c. Summary
In summation, it is helpful to recall a remark once made by a
delegate during the preparation of the 1988 United Nations Con-
vention on International Bills of Exchange and International
Promissory Notes, who pointedly said that
[t]he provision in question [Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties] was more suitable for Judges
of the International Court of Justice at The Hague than for the
judges of domestic commercial courts. It was essential to regu-
late the matter by way of a clear provision, drafted in precise
and habitual terms.213
In the case of the Sales Convention’s reservations, this im-
portant guideline has not always been sufficiently observed.
(The only upside of this neglect may be that it has given certain
authors something to write about.)
IV. LOOKING FORWARD TO THENEXT THIRTY-FIVE YEARS: THE
(LIKELY) ROLE OF RESERVATIONS IN FUTURE CISG PRACTICE
When attempting a look into the Sales Convention’s future,
with an aim toward identifying its reservations’ role in the years
to come, three prognoses come to mind.
A. The Continuing Trend to Withdraw Reservations
1. Reasons for the Trend
The recent trend among CISG Contracting States to withdraw
reservations in accordance with Article 97(4) CISG that has been
referred to earlier,214 as well as elsewhere,215 is likely to continue
in the years to come. This prognosis is supported by three differ-
ent reasons. First, general policy arguments militate in favor of
further withdrawals, as they reduce the potential for confusion
in the Convention’s practical application.216 Second, principles of
treaty law as embodied in the International Law Commission’s
213. SeeWinship, supra note 8, at 728.
214. See supra Part III.B.1.
215. Andersen, supra note 120, at 706–09; Schroeter, supra note 17, at 2–4.
216. See Ulrich G. Schroeter (Rapporteur), Use of Reservations Under the
CISG, Advisory Declaration No. 2, CISG Advisory Council (Oct. 21, 2013), in
INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT [INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW] 131–32 (Rolf
Herber et al. eds., 2014); Giegerich, supra note 10, para. 5.
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“Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties” call upon reserv-
ing States to undertake a periodic review of their reservations
and consider withdrawing those which no longer serve their pur-
pose.217And third, the view proposed here that characterizes res-
ervations as a uniformity-enabling tool218 implies that States
withdraw reservations once the initial reasons against a full ac-
cession219 or the uncertainty about the Convention’s application
in practice220 have disappeared—a point that has arguably been
reached, at least as far as the written form reservation under
Article 96 CISG is concerned.221
2. Potential Withdrawals of Article 95 CISG Reservations
It will be particularly interesting to see when future withdraw-
als will affect those two reservations that have hitherto re-
mained almost222 untouched by withdrawals, namely the reser-
vations under Articles 94 and 95 CISG.
With respect to Article 95 reservations, discussions about a
possible withdrawal have been reported from a number of re-
serving States. In the United States, the matter was investi-
gated in 2012 at a meeting of the State Department Advisory
Committee on Private International Law.223 However, the view
among CISG experts from the United States apparently remains
divided.224 Indications for an upcoming withdrawal of its Arti-
217. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 46, para. 2.5.3.
218. See supra Part III.B.
219. See supra Part III.B.2.
220. See supra Part III.B.1.
221. See Schroeter, The Cross-Border Freedom of Form Principle Under Res-
ervation, supra note 27, at 89. For a discussion of Hungary’s withdrawal of its
Article 96 CISG reservation effected in 2015, see Schroeter, supra note 127, at
211.
222. In 1992, Canada withdrew an Article 95 CISG reservation, which it had
initially––in combination with a declaration under Article 93 CISG––made
only for the province of British Columbia. Declarations of Extension by Canada
to Territorial Units: Withdrawal of a Declaration Made by Canada upon Ac-
cession, U.N. Doc. C.N.255.1992.TREATIES-3 (Oct. 19, 1992).
223. See Peter Winship, Should the United States Withdraw its CISG Arti-
cle 95 Declaration? (Oct. 11–12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
224. Cf. Letter from Harry M. Flechtner to Keith Loken, Assistant Legal Ad-
viser, Office of Private International Law (Jan. 30, 2012) (on file with author);
Asa Markel, American, English and Japanese Warranty Law Compared:
Should the U. S. Reconsider Her Article 95 Declaration to the CISG?, 21 PACE
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cle 95 reservation have also been reported from the People’s Re-
public of China.225 In addition, academic commentators have in
the past voiced pleas in favor of similar withdrawals to be made
by other reservation States,226 such as Singapore.227 However,
none of these initiatives have yet resulted in a declaration of
withdrawal being formally notified to the Convention’s deposi-
tary, as required by Article 97(2), (4) CISG.
It is submitted that a withdrawal of Article 95 reservations
would of course be a useful contribution to further uniformity
under the Sales Convention, but from a comparative perspective
does not rank as a high priority. This is due to the effect of this
reservation, which only228 excludes the reserving State’s obliga-
tion to apply Article 1(1)(b) CISG.229 This very provision, how-
ever, has today lost much of its practical importance, because
the Convention now applies in accordance with Article 1(1)(a)
CISG in the vast majority of cases, given that the number of
CISG Contracting States has reached eighty-three.230 Any with-
drawal of an Article 95 reservation would therefore merely open
up a second avenue toward the application of the Convention
that, in practice, would rarely come into play anyway.
3. Less Likely Withdrawals of Article 94 CISG Reservations
Compared to Article 95 reservations, a withdrawal of Arti-
cle 94 reservations would be both more valuable for the uniform
application of the Sales Convention and more unlikely to occur
in the foreseeable future. The greater value of such a withdrawal
INT’L L. REV. 163, 199–203 (2009); Francesco G. Mazzotta, Reconsidering the
CISG Article 95 Reservation made by the United States of America, 17 INT’L
TRADE&BUS. L. REV. 442, 442–46 (2014); Winship, supra note 223.
225. Andersen, supra note 26, at 11–12; Li Wei, On China’s Withdrawal of
Its Reservation to CISG Article 1(b), 2 RENMIN CHINESE L. REV. 300, 313–18
(2014); Spagnolo, supra note 14, at 71.
226. Castellani, supra note 56, at 685.
227. Bell, supra note 207, at 55.
228. Similarly, during the 1980 Vienna Conference, USSR delegate No-
vossiltsev observed, “The proposed [Article 95 CISG] reservation would repre-
sent a very small departure from the Convention compared with the ac-
ceptance of by States of Part II or Part III only [as allowed under Article 92
CISG].” Official Records, supra note 47, at 439.
229. See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 26, at 120–21,
opinion 1 cmts. 3.17–19.
230. BRIDGE, supra note 44, at 522 para. 10.57; Spagnolo, supra note 14,
at 71.
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arises from the more far-reaching effect of Article 94 reserva-
tions, which exclude the application of the entire Convention
whenever they apply, even if only to contracts between parties
residing in reservation States (currently, the intra-Nordic
trade). That Scandinavian States are nevertheless unlikely to
initiate a withdrawal of their Article 94 reservations is indicated
by recent developments.
Although Scandinavian commentators have for some time sug-
gested that Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden
should withdraw their respective reservations under Article 94
CISG,231 they admitted as recently as 2012 that “there is cur-
rently little support among Scandinavian legislators for that
proposal.”232 In fact, there more recently has been a rather clear
sign against such a withdrawal, as Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden even extended their Article 94 reservations when
they withdrew their Article 92 reservations in 2011–14.233 In
that context, they declared that “[i]n addition to the previous
declaration made under Article 94 . . . the Convention will not
apply to the formation of contracts of sale where the parties have
their places of business in Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden
or Norway.”234 They thereby extended the already existing non-
application of the Convention between Scandinavian parties in
sale of goods matters (resulting from the existing reservations
under Article 94 CISG) and also to matters of contract formation
that had previously been covered by the Article 92 reservations
concurrently withdrawn. This combination of Article 92 CISG
withdrawals with new Article 94 CISG reservations indicates
the Nordic countries’ intention to make sure that the application
231. Morten M. Fogt, The Stipulation and Interpretation of Freight Prepaid
Delivery clauses under the CISG––Preliminary Considerations for Reform of
Part II of the CISG and a Limited Withdrawal of Scandinavian Declarations,
2 EUR. LEGAL F. 61, 64–65 (2003); Joseph Lookofsky, The CISG in Denmark
and Danish Courts, 80 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 295, 301–02 (2011).
232. Lookofsky, supra note 40, § 8.6.
233. See SCHLECHTRIEM& SCHROETER, supra note 20, para. 811.
234. Finland: Declaration Under Article 94, U.N. Doc.
C.N.765.2011.TREATIES-X.10 (May 14, 2012); Sweden: Declaration Under
Article 94, U.N. Doc. C.N.290.2012.TREATIES-X.10 (May 30, 2012); Denmark:
Declaration Under Article 94, U.N. Doc. C.N.348.2012.TREATIES-X.10 (July
3, 2012); Norway: Declaration Under Article 94, U.N. Doc.
C.N.215.2014.TREATIES-X.10 (Apr. 16, 2014).
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of the Sales Convention to the inter-Scandinavian trade will con-
tinue to be excluded.235
Against this background, it must seem unlikely that they will
withdraw the very reservations they so recently confirmed in the
near future.
B. A Reservation Here to Stay: The Federal State Clause (Arti-
cle 93 CISG)
Another reservation that is here to stay, albeit for a different
reason, is Article 93 CISG.236 It becomes apparent when looking
in more detail at the purposes for which the Sales Convention’s
“federal State clause” has been used in treaty practice. Two pur-
poses can be distinguished.
The first is the making of an Article 93 reservation in order to
allow a federal State to adopt the CISG incrementally as the
adopting legislation goes through the separate legislatures of
each of the territorial units of that State.237 Where it is used to
this end, the federal state clause works in conformity with the
general view described earlier238 that regards reservations as a
uniformity-enabling tool; it thus leads to a merely temporary re-
duction of uniformity. A practical example was the adoption of
the Sales Convention by Canada. Upon accession to the Conven-
tion in 1991, the Government of Canada declared, in accordance
with Article 93 CISG, that the Convention will extend to the
provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Bruns-
wick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Is-
land, and the Northwest Territories.239 In April 1992, it then de-
clared the Convention to apply also to Quebec and Saskatche-
wan,240 before further extending the CISG to the Territory of the
235. Schroeter, supra note 17, at 7–8.
236. For a discussion of Article 93 CISG, see supra Part II.A.2.b.
237. BRIDGE, supra note 44, at 520 n.402.
238. See supra Part III.B.
239. Accession by Canada, U.N. Doc. C.N.88.1991.TREATIES-2 (May 31,
1991).
240. Declarations of Extension by Canada to Territorial Units: Withdrawal
of a Declaration Made by Canada upon Accession, U.N. Doc.
C.N.255.1992.TREATIES-3 (Oct. 19, 1992). Canada thereby used the option
offered by Article 93(1) CISG in fine to “amend” a declaration under the federal
state clause “at any time,” which has to be distinguished from the withdrawal
of a reservation as authorized by Article 97(4) CISG. A later amendment
through unilateral declaration is not expressly foreseen for any other CISG
reservation.
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Yukon (in June 1992) and—although only a decade later (in
2003)—to the Territory of Nunavut.241
It is the second purpose which may give Article 93 CISG an
“eternal” character. Federal state clauses can also be used in def-
erence to local or regional particularities that exist in certain
territorial units of a federal state, geographical, or otherwise.
Where this is the case, the reservation is likely to stay in effect
as long as these particularities remain unchanged. Under the
Sales Convention, all Article 93 reservations currently in force
seem to fall into this category. Australia has declared that the
Convention shall not apply to the territories of Christmas Is-
land, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, and the Ashmore and Cartier
Islands.242 Denmark has declared that the Convention shall not
apply to the Faroe Islands and Greenland,243 and New Zealand
has declared that the Convention shall not apply to the Cook Is-
lands, Niue, and Tokelau.244 In present practice under the Con-
vention, the Article 93 reservation is accordingly a pure “island
reservation.” The special geographical situation of islands, often
reflected in their special status under domestic constitutions,
means that these reservations are unlikely to be withdrawn. At
the same time, the amount of international trade conducted by
parties from those islands is very limited. From a practical per-
spective, the effect of Article 93 CISG upon the Convention’s ap-
plication is therefore close to zero.245
It is another, more difficult question, whether the status of the
important international trading hubs of Hong Kong and Macao
are cases equally covered by Article 93 CISG, or not—a question
that has been addressed in more detail elsewhere.246
241. Canada: Declaration in Accordance with Article 93, U.N. Doc.
C.N.631.2003.TREATIES-2 (June 19, 2003).
242. Australian Declaration to CISG under Article 93, Mar. 17, 1983, 1489
U.N.T.S. 435.
243. Ratification by Denmark and the German Democratic Republic, U.N.
Doc. C.N.41.1989.TREATIES-1 (Apr. 17, 1989).
244. Accession by Cuba, the Republic of Moldova and New Zealand, U.N. Doc.
C.N.343.1994.TREATIES-4 (Jan. 17, 1995).
245. For a similar assessment, see De Ly, supra note 80, at 10; Magnus, su-
pra note 40, art. 93 para. 8.
246. Markus Buschbaum, Anwendbarkeit des UN-Kaufrechts im Verhältnis
zu Hongkong, 24 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND
VERFAHRENSRECHTS 546 (2004); Ulirch G. Schroeter, The Status of Hong Kong
and Macao Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 307 (2004); Fan Yang, A Uniform
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C. A Reservation Which May Gain in Importance: Article 94
CISG as a Tool to Accommodate a Regionalization of Uniform
Lawmaking
Finally, there is one reservation authorized by the Sales Con-
vention which may potentially gain in importance in the future,
namely Article 94 CISG. In addition to the current use of this
reservation by the Nordic States that was addressed earlier,247
Article 94 CISG could also be used in order to give precedence to
other uniform law rules shared between certain CISG Contract-
ing States.248 The existing trend toward a regionalization of uni-
form lawmaking that has been much discussed in legal writ-
ing249 may give rise to such rules that then would compete with
the CISG. Certain rules, notably those emerging from EU direc-
tives, arguably already do so, albeit only with respect to limited
subject matters.250 Rules made by other regional economic inter-
national organizations (“REIOs”) may follow.
As long as no Contracting State takes any action to the con-
trary, regionally unified or harmonized laws remain preempted
by the Sales Convention in accordance with general rules gov-
erning the relationship between the Convention and other rules
of law.251 There may, however, be pressure upon Contracting
States to give precedence to regional law that may, for example,
result from a duty to guarantee the full application of rules is-
sued by regional organizations. A possible source of such a duty
Sales Law for the Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR and Taiwan
– the CISG, 15 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 345 (2011).
247. See supra Part V.A.3.
248. Stefan Leible, Konflikte zwischen CESL und CISG – Zum Verhältnis
zwischen Art. 351 AEUV und Artt. 90, 94 CISG [Conflicts Between CESL and
CISG––On the Relationship Between Article 35], in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ULRICH
MAGNUS ZUM 70 [FESTSCHRIFT FOR ULRICH MAGNUS’S 70TH BIRTHDAY].
GEBURTSTAG 605, 615 (Peter Mankowski & Wolfgang Wurmnest eds., 2013);
Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 94 para. 5; SCHROETER, supra note 23, § 10.
249. See generally CISG VS. REGIONAL SALES LAW UNIFICATION (Ulrich Mag-
nus ed., 2012); Emmanuel T. Laryea, Globalizing International Trade Invest-
ment and Commercial Laws Through Regionalism: The Prospects, in
GLOBALIZATION VERSUS REGIONALIZATION 57–77 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lisa
Spagnolo eds., 2013); Ulrich G. Schroeter, Global Uniform Sales Law––With a
European Twist? CISG Interaction with EU Law, 13 VINDOBONA J. IN’TL COM.
L. & ARB. 179–80 (2009).
250. See SCHROETER, supra note 23, §§ 6, 15.
251. Id. §§ 7–15; Schroeter, supra note 249, at 190.
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is Article 351(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union which obliges EU Member States to “take all appro-
priate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established”252 to
the extent that a concurrent international agreement (e.g. the
CISG) is not compatible with EU Treaties or EU secondary law.
As an appropriate step of this kind is notably the denunciation
of a concurrent treaty,253 the European Commission could theo-
retically request EU Member States which have ratified the
Sales Convention to denounce the Convention in accordance
with Article 101 CISG.254 Should a Member State refuse to com-
ply with such a request, the Commission could initiate an action
under Article 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union before the European Court of Justice against the
State for failure to fulfill obligations. In recent years, the Euro-
pean Commission has increasingly brought such actions for fail-
ure to adopt appropriate measures to eliminate incompatibilities
with the EC Treaty of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) en-
tered into with third countries prior to the respective Member
States’ accession to the EU.255 It could do the same with respect
to the Sales Convention.
Against this background, a reservation in accordance with Ar-
ticle 94 CISG would constitute a preferable alternative to the
complete denunciation of the Sales Convention.256 The making
of such a reservation would grant EU law precedence over the
CISG’s rules, while leaving the Convention in force. From the
perspective of global uniform sales law, this is the lesser of two
evils when compared with the all-or-nothing solution offered by
252. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 351(2), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C83) 47.
253. Case C-84/98, European Commission v. Portugal, 2000 E.C.R. I-5219;
Case C-216/01, Budéjovický Budvar, národní podnik v. Rudolf Ammersin
GmbH, 2003 E.C.R. I-13617.
254. SCHROETER, supra note 23, § 13 para. 59.
255. See, e.g., Case C-205/06, European Commission v. Austria, 2009 E.C.R.
I-01301.
256. Note that contrary to the CISG’s reservations under Articles 92, 93, and
95, and also contrary to the residuary rule in Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, an Article 94 CISG reservation may not
only be made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or ac-
ceding to the Convention, but also at any time thereafter. CISG, supra note 4,
art. 94(1), (2). For a discussion of the relationship between reservations and
denunciations from a general treaty law perspective, see Helfer, supra note
135, at 379–81.
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Article 101 CISG.257 And from the perspective of EU law, the
making of an Article 94 CISG reservation would constitute a suf-
ficient elimination of possible incompatibilities between the two
legal regimes.258 In its recent case law, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) has held that provisions reserving the application
of EU law that are contained in concurrent international agree-
ments may serve to eliminate incompatibilities.259 In particular,
the ECJ mentioned “a clause which would reserve certain pow-
ers to regional organizations” (commonly referred to as “REIO
clause”) and expressly acknowledged “that such a clause should,
in principle, as the Commission admitted at the hearing, be con-
sidered capable of removing the established incompatibility.”260
Having said this, it should be kept in mind that—as discussed
earlier261—it is one matter for the Sales Convention to authorize
a certain reservation, but quite another whether Contracting
States will or should make use of it. Where the choice is between
the CISG and regionally unified law, it is submitted that the
Sales Convention should preferably be left untouched, as cross-
border trade is best served by a globally unified sales law.262 Ar-
ticle 94 CISG should accordingly offer no more than a last resort
in case that political pressure imposes a different choice.
CONCLUSION
This article attempted to provide an overview of the experi-
ences that have been made with the Sales Convention’s reserva-
tions during their first thirty-five years, from 1980–2015. In do-
ing so, it has also attempted to challenge the traditionally pre-
vailing notion which views reservations as a “necessary evil”263
and to demonstrate that reservations can instead be viewed as a
tool enabling a wider uniformity under uniform private law con-
ventions.264 When considering the widespread withdrawals of
CISG reservations that have occurred since 2011,265 it is there-
fore one possibility to describe this development as a “decline of
257. SCHROETER, supra note 23, § 13 para. 59.
258. Contra Leible, supra note 248, at 614.
259. European Commission v. Austria, supra note 255, para. 32.
260. Id. paras. 41–42.
261. See supra Part II.B.1.
262. Schroeter, supra note 249, at 189.
263. Andersen, supra note 26, at 5.
264. See supra Part. III.B.
265. See supra Part III.B.1.
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reservations” in accordance with a panel title at a recent CISG
conference.266 Another possibility would be to view these with-
drawals as indications of a “mission accomplished.”
At this stage, it is helpful to once more come back to numbers.
When the Sales Convention entered into force on January 1,
1988, the then fourteen Contracting States267 had between them
declared nine reservations, amounting to almost one reservation
per Contracting State. As noted in the introduction,268 by the
Convention’s twenty-fifth birthday both total numbers had in-
creased to sixty-five Contracting States and thirty-one reserva-
tions, but the reservation to Contracting State ratio had dropped
from almost 1:1 to less than 1:2. This year, as we are celebrating
the CISG’s thirty-fifth birthday, we count eighty-three Contract-
ing States, but only twenty-three reservations. If we further-
more deduct the “eternal” federal State reservations that proba-
bly will remain in effect forever,269 we arrive at a ratio of 20:83,
or almost 1:4.
In conclusion, this development confirms a personal experi-
ence that many people have encountered. At thirty-five, one may
be not be as young and fresh anymore as at twenty-five, but
maybe a little wiser. And for a uniform law, that may well be the
more important quality.
266. Conference “35 Years CISG and Beyond” held at the University of Basel
(Switzerland) on January 29—30, 2015, organized by the University of Basel,
the Swiss Association of International Law and UNCITRAL.
267. For the purposes of the present calculations, a “Contracting State” is
every State that has deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, ap-
proval or accession with the Secretary-General of the U.N. in accordance with
Article 91(4) CISG, even if the Convention has not yet entered into force for
that State due to Article 99(2) CISG. See ENDERLEIN&MASKOW, supra note 45,
at 367. By January 1, 1988, Lesotho, France, the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt,
Hungary, Argentina, Zambia, the Peoples’ Republic of China, Italy, the United
States, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Mexico (in chorological order) had be-
come Contracting States of the CISG. Chronological Table of Actions: United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/un-
citral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status_chronological.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2016).
268. See supra Part I.A.
269. See supra Part V.B.
